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The Judicial Conference of the United States has approved a model
student practice rule for consideration by the United States courts.1 This
approval was the natural, if not universally acclaimed, result of the ad-
vent of a clinical component to legal education.2 A majority of American
Bar Association-approved law schools have some type of clinical pro-
gram,3 and the courts have readily complimented this remarkable addi-
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I SuacommITTE ON RULES FOR LIMrED ADMISSION TO PRACTICE OF LAW STUDENTS, FI-
NAL REPORT TO THE COMMrrTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO CON-
SIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1978) [hereinafter
cited as FINAL REPORT], cited in COMMITrrE TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO
PRACTIcE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, FINAL REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, 83 F.R.D. 215, 226 n.20 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DEvrr REPORT] (honor-
ing committee chairman, Edward V. Devitt, Chief Judge of the District of Minnesota). The
text of the Model Student Practice Rule (Model Rule) appears in FINAL REPORT, supra at 4-
21. The Rule is also reproduced in Walker, The Spirited Adolescence of the Clinical Com-
ponent of Legal Education, Fourth Circuit Student Advocacy Conference: Papers and Re-
marks, 87 F.R.D. 159, 172 n.28 (1980).
2 See Pincus, Legal Education in a Service Setting, in COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION
FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 27 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT]; Brickman, CLEPR and
Legal Education: A Review and Analysis, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT,
supra at 56. CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT was distributed before the Council
on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) conference at Buck Hill Falls,
Pa., on June 6-9, 1973. The proceedings of the conference were published as COUNCIL ON
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STU-
DENT. CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (1973) [hereinafter cited as CLEPR CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS].
3 COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SURVEY AND DMEc-
TOR OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 1977-1978 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977-78 CLEPR
SURvEY]. For a recent survey demonstrating the wealth of opportunities for interdisciplinary
studies, and the varieties of clinical programs, see Leleiko, Clinical Education, Empirical
Study and Legal Scholarship, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 149 (1979).
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tion to the law school curriculum. Nearly every state court system has a
student practice rule.4 Five federal courts of appeals5 and twenty-seven
district courts6 have a published procedure for law student practice.
' See 1977-78 CLEPR SURVEY, supra note 3, at xvi-xvii, 119 (noting that two of the
three jurisdictions that have not adopted state student practice rule do not have law school
within their borders).
6 D.C. CIR. R. 20; IST CIR. STANDING R. GOVERNING APPEARANCE AND ARGUMENT BY ELI-
GIBLE LAW STUDENTS [hereinafter cited as 1ST CIR. R.]; 2D CIR. SUPP. R. § 46(e); 3D CIR. R.
9(2); 4TH CIR. Supp. R. 13. Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Circuit Executive for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, states that law students "supervised by an attor-
ney who has filed an appearance in the case," may represent clients in Seventh Circuit ap-
peals. Mr. Fitzpatrick also indicates that some of the other circuits may observe an unpub-
lished pro hac vice rule. Letter from Collins T. Fitzpatrick to George K. Walker (Jan. 13,
1977) [hereinafter cited as Collins Letter]; see also Leleiko, State and Federal Rules Per-
mitting the Student Practice of Law: Comparisons and Comments, in BAR ADMISSION
RULES AND STUDENT PRACTICE RuLES 913 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Leleiko]. Leleiko notes
that the Eighth Circuit has adopted a policy of individual.approval of student oral argument
under professional supervision. Id. at 926. The Supreme Court of the United States and
"specialized" federal appellate courts--the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals, and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals-have no student practice
rules.
A similar situation exists in the military courts. Despite the armed services' programs
for fully funded excess leave designed to encourage experienced officers to become judge
advocates, neither the Court of Military Appeals nor the services' intermediate appellate
courts of military review have formal provision for advocacy by these military officers while
they are law students. The review activities, however, which supply appellate counsel, re-
ceive both summer JAG-destined law clerks and summer interns to assist with the caseload.
Thus, there is some training available. These tribunals may not be "courts" in the constitu-
tional sense. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 5 at 13, § 11 at 37 (3d
ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. Nevertheless the appellate process is sufficiently
similar to the cirucit courts to provide a worthwhile experience for student advocates who
have sufficient background in military law and the proper supervision.
a D. CONN. R. Crv. P. 26; D. DEL. R. 4B (incorporating by reference DEL. SuP. CT. R. 55
and D.L. BD. BAR Ex uNERs R. BR-55.2); D.C.C.R. 2-9; N.D. GA. R. 71.9; D. HAWAII RULE
GOVERNING THE SUPERVISED STUDENT PRACTICE OF LAW [hereinafter cited as D. HAWAII R.];
D. IDAHO R. 2(g) (incorporating by reference IDAHO Sup. CT. R. 123); N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 41;
S.D. IOWA RULE RE MATTER OF PRACTICE BY LAW STUDENTS [hereinafter cited as S.D. IOWA
RULE]; D. KAN. STANDING ORDER ADOPTING RULE CONCERNING SERVICES OF CERTAIN LAW
STUDENTS [hereinafter cited as D. KAN. R.]. E.D. LA. R. 21.12-21.15; M.D. LA. R. 1J; D. ME.
R. 8; N.D. MISS. LOCAL RULE ESTABLISHING LAW STUDENT INTERN PRACTICE PROCEDURE
[hereinafter cited as N.D. Miss. STUDENT PRACTICE R.]; E.D. Mo. R. 26 (incorporating by
reference Mo. SuP. A. CT. R. 13); D. MONT. ORDER RE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STUDENT PRAC-
TICE RULE [hereinafter cited as D. MONT. ORDER]; S. DAK. R. 2 § 8; W.D. TENN. R. 1(a)(1);
E.D. VA. R. 7(N); W.D. VA. THIRD YEAR PRACTICE RULE. In general these rules have been
published in FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES FOR CIVIL AND ADMIRALTY PROCEEDINGS (Pike &
Fischer, Inc. ed 1979), although the diligence of Associate Professor Steven H. Leleiko
turned up a few more. His compilation is published in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 1161-1214;
see also id. at 913, 923-25 (summarizing Leleiko's research). The author of this article
shared his research findings with Professor Leleiko and uncovered a few more local rules
promulgated or published since 1978. Some district courts have reported that.student advo-
cates are allowed to appear in individual cases with consent of counsel, and others allow no
student appearances. Other district courts may have promulgated local student practice
rules after this research was completed, and some rules may have been revoked or amended.
The foregoing list therefore may not be complete. The Northern District of California's
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The Model Rule is also a concomitant of the current trend in the legal
profession for *emphasis on upgrading lawyer comptency. The recent
Devitt Report,7 which found that the quality of trial advocacy in the fed-
eral courts is often inadequate, recommends application of experience
standards for admission to the federal trial bar. Significantly for the topic
of this article, the Devitt Report also admonishes the federal district
court to "approve student practice rules" as a means of achieving im-
proved advocacy in the future. The Report further suggests that the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States
recommend to the Ameiican Bar Association that it consider
amending its law school accreditation standards to require that
all schools provide courses in trial advocacy, with student partici-
pation in actual or simulated trials taught by instructors having
litigation experience, and encourage the bench and bar to support
law schools in achieving the goal of providing quality trial advo-
cacy training to all students who want it.8
Similarly, the American Bar Association Task Force on Lawyer Compe-
tency has issued the Cramton Report,9 which recommends that law
schools offer widespread instruction in litigation skills.10 Hailed by the
Devitt Report as a "fundamental change in attitude of the leaders of
American legal education,""" the Cramton Report contains numerous rec-
MAGISTRATE CT. ORDER APPOINTING STUDENT LAW CLERK PANEL, see Leleiko, supra note 5,
at 1161, has not been included in the count and will not be considered in this article since it
provides for assistance to the magistrate and does not contemplate student practice in an
adversarial setting.
" DEvrrr REPORT, supra note 1, at 218.
8 Id. at 221, 222. The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) was not mentioned
in connection with possible accreditation amendments, although it also publishes require-
ments for member schools and cooperates with the American Bar Association (ABA) Sec-
tion. Compare ABA, APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLs: AMERIcAN BAR ASSoCIATION STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE As AMENDED (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS] with AALS,
BYLAWS AND ExEcuTIVE COMMITTEE REGULATIONS (1978), in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS INFORMATION (1978) [hereinafter cited as ASSOCIATION INFORMATION]. The ABA and
several states are working on certification procedures as well. See Leleiko, supra note 5, at
914.
, ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT AND REcoM-
MENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS
(1979) [hereinafter cited as CRAMTON REPORT] (honoring section chairman Roger C. Cram-
ton, Dean of Cornell Law School). These proposals have not been approved by the ABA's
Board of Governors or its House of Delegates "and therefore do not represent the policy of
the [ABA]." Id. at i. Chief Justice Burger sees the two highlights of the CRAMTON REPORT as
"acceptance of the idea that training in practical aspects of lawyering should begin in law
school and should be available to every student who wants it; and ... that experienced trial
lawyers and trial judges must be drawn into the teaching process, working with the facul-
ties." Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A.J. 295, 296
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Burger].
10 CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
DEvrr REPORT, supra note 1, at 221.
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ommendations related to clinical legal education. 2 It does not adopt,
however, the Devitt Committee's suggestion of accreditation changes that
would mandate a certain amount of clinical training.13 This disagreement
is significant because "[s]tudent practice ultimately affects and is affected
by all these [and other,] matters."
'1 '
This article begins with a study of the federal courts' supervisory au-
thority under statutes and rules of procedure over those who practice
before them, and these courts' inherent authority over the bar. This study
demonstrates that the Model Rule's policy of granting the courts final
authority to control clinical cases and clinical legal education is merely a
manifestation of the authority that courts have always held to govern the
conduct of cases, and hence the lawyers, appearing before them. The
Model Rule and its antecedents then will be compared and analyzed, with
particular reference to the American Bar Association's draft model rule of
1969'5 and published federal student practice rules. Policy and empirical
factors in student practice will be considered in the light of these rules.
Finally, the article will look beyond the Model Rule and its Comments,
tying together analysis of the Model Rule and suggesting questions that
may not have been considered by its drafters. This section will also con-
sider questions which may be the next round of issues inherent in adop-
tion of the Model Rule, and the Rule's input into legal education. The
conclusion is that although a Model Rule is useful, individual United
States courts should continue to tailor local student practice regulations
to particular local situations until experience under the Model Rule is
available for a more uniform national treatment.
This article does not propose to enter the continuing debate over
clinical education within the law school curriculum, nor does it discuss
the propriety of having a trial component to a clinical program. To be
sure, there is a troubling parallel trend toward anti-intellectualism in le-
gal education today,' 6 and therefore perhaps away from the traditional
" See generally CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-7. The CRAMTON REPORT propos-
als will be analyzed periodically in the course of this article.
"S Compare CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 5, 27-28 with Dzvr RREPORT, supra
note 1, at 228-29. The DEvrrr REPORT reflects the policy of state courts such as the New
York Court of Appeals and the internal policies of many law schools in establishing prereq-
uisites for advanced courses. See Leleiko, supra note 5, at 934.
" Leleiko, supra note 5, at 914.
lB The American Bar Association's draft model rule of 1969 (ABA RUL.) is reprinted in
Leleiko, supra note 5, at 993-95, and in E. KrrcH, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW
SCHOOL OF THE FUTruRE 228-31 (1970) [cited hereinafter as KITCH]. "Judge [Alvin B] Rubin
[of the Eastern District of Louisiana, now a judge of the Fifth Circuit] was the architect of
the [1969] ABA Model Rule .... " Klein, The Courtroom as Classroom: The View from
the Bench, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 91, 93. In 1979, the ABA
Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar prepared an amended
student practice rule (AMENDED ABA RULE) which was adopted by the ABA House of Dele-
gates. The new rule is identical with the 1969 version except for the deletion of the limita-
tion that law students may represent only indigents.
11 See H. PACKER & T. EHRLCH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 46 (1972) [here-
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purposes of a law school.17 Nevertheless, this article will assume that
inafter cited as PACKER-EHRLICH RERORT]; Allen, The New Anti-Intellectualism in Ameri-
can Legal Education, 28 MERCER L. REv. 447, 450-56 (1977). The controversy between most
legal educators, who see the law school's role as providing a primarily academic experience,
and some members of the bar, who would advocate an entirely skills-training and program-
med-learning approach, is not new. The debate resurfaced in the 1950's. See, e.g., Cantrall,
The Practical Skills Can and Must Be Taught in the Law Schools, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 316
(1954); Cantrall, Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing Its Job? 38
A.B.A.J. 907 (1952); McClain, Legal Education: The Extent to Which "Know-How" in
Practice Should be Taught in the Law Schools, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 302 (1954); McClain, Is
Legal Education Doing Its Job? A Reply, 39 A.B.A.J. 120 (1953). Professor Allen's article,
supra and the exchanges in bar journals, see, e.g., Seidman & Heinz, What (If Anything) Is
Wrong With Legal Education? 5 VA. BAR ASS'N J. 18 (No. 3, 1979); Lawscope, Say More
Dollars Crucial to Law School Improvement, 65 A.B.A.J. 1034 (1979), indicate that the
swords (or pens) may have been sharpened for another round.
The literature on clinical legal education is immense. Among the best current sources
are CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2; KTCH, supra note 15 (cover-
ing early student practice rules); Leleiko, supra note 5 (extensive bibliography); CoUNCIL ON
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY, STATE RULES PERMITTING THE STUDENT
PRACTICE OF LAW (1973) (introductory essay and annotated bibliography); COUNCiL ON LE-
GAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, SELECTED READINGS IN CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION (1973) [hereinafter cited as CLEPR, SELECTED READINGS] (reproducing many
leading articles to that date); Snyman, A Proposal for a National Link-Up of the Now
Legal Services Corporation Law Offices and Law School Clinical Training Programs, 30 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 43, 56-66 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Snyman].
17 Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. has praised the value of the law school "where, to the
highest degree possible in our culture, carefully chosen men think, write and teach about the
rational governance of our polity. .. ."Black, Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present
Day, 79 YALE L.J. 505, 510 (1970). Professor Black made this statement in the context of his
opposition to changing the law schools from traditional academic institutions "into agencies
of social action." Id. In an interview, he stated that a distortion in the direction of a clini-
cally-oriented law school devoid of the traditional academic discipline that has been "a na-
tional asset," would be a grave mistake. Leading jurists view the function of legal education
as teaching a way of thinking and as learning basic theoretical and doctrines of broad appli-
cation. Powell, Clinical Education in Law School, 26 S.C.L. REv. 389, 393 (1974); id. at 391,
quoting Kaufman, The Education of the Advocate, 6 CLEPR NE.WSLETrER 8 (1974);
Butzner, Remarks, Fourth Circuit Student Advocacy Conference: Papers and Remarks, 87
F.R.D. 166 (1980). Professor Binder has stated the point pragmatically and succinctly:
"[Tihe training institution's first concern must be that of educating students.... "Binder,
Education Versus Service in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 35, 48.
Professor Leleiko urges, however, that "the American law school ... must reorient its
perspectives if it is to be a viable instrument of professional education in the future."
Leleiko, supra note 5, at 932. He further comments that law schools today have the respon-
sibility to assist their students to establish a "life-long process of study that includes and
considers the 'consumer perspective'." Id.; see also Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85
HARv. L. REv. 392, 397-98 (1971) (response to Professor Black). A clinician has asserted that
the law schools' clinical offices should be an integrated part of a service-oriented profession:
[A] free and uninhibited legal profession group [that] is the keystone, if not the
base, for a successful governance. The responsibility of the bar in the public law
field in a democracy is greater than that under any other form of governmental
relationship. The responsibility to guide, strengthen and reform relationships be-
tween the people and the government is primarily that of the members of the bar.
They are responsible for the administration of the laws of the governed. The per-
vasive feeling that ours is a service profession is soon recognized by the student in
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clinical legal education programs are a permanent feature of the law
school curriculum.
1 8
II. The Federal Court's Authority to Adopt A Student Practice Rule
The Judicial Conference has recommended the Model Rule solely for
consideration and adoption by each federal court. The Rule has not been
proposed as a binding procedure for all the federal courts, to be promul-
gated by the Supreme Court under the Enabling Act'9 or other author-
ity.20 Thus, the Rule does not have the potential status of suggested
changes to the civil procedure rules.2 ' Nevertheless, there is ample au-
thority under current legislation, rules of court and the court's inherent
authority over cases and attorneys appearing before them to promulgate
student practice regulations patterned on the Model Rule.
The Enabling Act grants the Supreme Court and all courts established
by Congress,22 power to prescribe civil rules of procedure that are not
inconsistent with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court or Acts of
Congress. Similar legislation exists for the criminal rules, 3 magistrates'
cases,24 multidistrict civil litigation,25 and bankruptcy proceedings."
a teaching law office. In accepting this philosophy, he accepts the responsibility of
professional "law guardianship" to the public.
Miller, Living Professional Responsibility - Clinical Approach, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR
THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 99, 104.
'8 Snyman, supra note 15, at 43; Toll, CLEPR from the Viewpoint of Legal Aid and
Legal Services, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 17, 22-23.
19 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976).
20 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3402 (1976) (power to promulgate magistrate rules); 18 U.S.C. §
3771-72 (1976) (power to promulgate rules of criminal procedure); 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1976)
(power to promulgate rules governing multidistrict litigation); 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976) (pro-
mulgation of bankruptcy rules). See also notes 23-26 infra.
"' See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979). The proposed changes to the Civil Procedure Rules,
modified in some respects, are now in effect. See Amendments to the Fedeal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980).
:2 28 U.S.C. § 43 (1976) creates 11 judicial circuits, and 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976) allocates
the states, the District of Columbia and the territories to them. 28 U.S.C. § 132 (1976)
creates the district courts, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (1976) establishes the district courts for
the states, the District of Columbia and the territories.
23 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1976). Although there have been numerous congressional revi-
sions of criminal rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, none has involved FED. R. CRIm.
P. 57, which deals with the power of the district courts to promulgate local rules of court.
Thus there is no need in this article to chart further the labyrinthine course of the criminal
rules between the Court and Congress. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 63, at 295-97;
1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2, 4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE].
21 18 U.S.C. § 3402 (1976). Pursuant to this rulemaking authority over magistrate trials,
the Supreme Court promulgated FED. R. PRAC. FOR TRIAL OF MINOR OFFENSES.
25 28 U.S.C. § 1047(f) (1976). The Multidistrict Litigation Rules of Procedure have no
provisions for student practice. See generally 15 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
supra note 23, § 3865.
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Other matters, such as habeas corpus, are covered both by the civil rules27
and certain specialized rules. A similar situation exists with respect to the
criminal rules; exceptions of interest for student advocates include United
States Magistrates' trial of minor offenses, extradition and juvenile delin-
quency cases. 28 The federal appellate rules, promulgated pursuant to
Congressional authority for resolution of appeals from the district and
other trial courts, 29 are uniform for all appeals.30 These rules for the dis-
trict and circuit courts contain several provisions related to student prac-
tice in their regulation of counsel but none specifically approve or forbid
student advocacy. Thus, the authority for regulating student practice de-
rives from interpretations of the rules permitting the employment of local
rule-making authority.
The federal appellate rules provide that any attorney of "good moral
character" admitted to practice before the Supreme Court, the highest
court of any state, another federal court of appeals, or a federal district
court shall be admitted to a court of appeals bar upon completion of cer-
tain administrative requirements.3' "A court of appeals may... take any
appropriate disciplinary action against any attorney who practices before
it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to comply
with [the federal appellate] rules or any rule of the court.132 There are
also provisions for disbarment or suspension from practice upon a show-
ing to the court that the lawyer "has been guilty of conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar of the court. 33 Although neither the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain sim-
ilar provisions," this federal statute long has required that all United
1$ 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(1); BANKRUPTCY RULES 701-71.
See generally WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 63, at 295-96; 4 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE, supra note 23, § 1016 (1979 Pocket Part); 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 7 1.03[2] (2d
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's]. Another separate set of procedural rules exist for
copyright cases. See WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 63, at 296; 4 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, supra note 23, § 1018; 2 MOORE'S supra 1.03[3].
27 FED. R. Crv. P. 81(a)(2); RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS, RULa 11 [hereinafter cited as SECTION 2254 R.]. See also RULES
GOVERNING SECTION 2255 CASES IN THE UNTED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, RULE 12 [hereinaf-
ter cited as SECTION 2255 R.] (referring to both civil and criminal rules).
23 FED. R. Cim. P. 54(b)(4)-(5). The Supreme Court has promulgated separate rules for
magistrates. See note 24 supra.
29 See generally WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 104; 9 MOORE'S, supra note 26, 100.01; 16
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 23, §§ 3945-46.
30 FED. R. App. P. 1(a). Despite the uniformity of the federal appellate rules, special
provisions govern different classes of appealed cases. See FED. R. ApP. P. 3-24.
S FED. R. App. P. 46(a).
31 FED. R. App. 46(c). In federal court of appeals disciplinary actions, the lawyer is enti-
tled to notice, opportunity to show cause, and a hearing if requested. Id.
'3FED. R. App. P. 46(b). Prior to disbarment or suspension, the lawyer must have an
opportunity to show good cause and to request a hearing. Id.
3 U.S. SuP. CT. R. 5-8 govern practice before the Supreme Court of the United States
but student practice before the Court would appear to be largely precluded because of U.S.
Sup. CT. R. 5.1's prerequisite of three years' practice before "the highest court of a State,
1980] 1107
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States courts permit and regulate the appearance of counsel.3 5 There are
references to lawyers within these various rules, such as oral argument by
counsel in the appellate rules,s the requirement of the attorney's signa-
ture on the pleadings if a party is represented by counsel and the court's
directing counsel to appear at a civil pretrial conference.3 7 The multidis-
trict rules also provide for admission to practice before the panel on such
cases and in transferred actions." Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 44,
echoing the sixth amendment and referring to the Criminal Justice Act
(CJA),39 states that "[e]very defendant who is unable to obtain counsel
shall be entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him at every
stage of the proceedings .... ",4 The CJA also requires counsel for crimi-
nal appeals.," Counsel may be waived,' 2 however, and there are also situa-
tions where counsel is not required.4' The post-conviction rules for the
district courts also articulate the need for counsel for discovery and in an
evidentiary hearing," and these proceedings may be otherwise governed
by the general civil or criminal rules.46 There are other statutes, among
them provisions for indigents' litigation, that permit or require appoint-
ment of counsel.4' Thus, there is ample requirement for counsel in the
Territory, District, Commonwealth, or Possession." Nevertheless, the Court could stretch its
pro hac vice admissions practice or make special orders in a particular case to accommodate
student advocates. See R. STERN & E. GREssMAN, SuPREME COURT PRACTICE § 19.7 (5th ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as STERN & GRESSMAN]; U.S. SuP. CT. R. 6. The Court's crushing
workload will probably preclude any suggestion of student practice before the Supreme
Court for years to come. See STERN & GREssMAN, supra § 1.16, at 38. There is no reason,
however, to preclude acknowledgement of student assistance in Supreme Court papers. See,
e.g., A. LEWIs, GIDEON'S TRuMPET 122-29, 138 (1964). Recently the Court promulgated re-
vised rules, 85 F.R.D. 435 (1980), effective June 30, 1980, but none directly affect student
practice.
:5 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976).
1 FED. R. App. P. 34(c).
37 FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16.
" JUDICIAL PANEL MULTIDIST. R. P. 3, provides that local counsel must follow the pere-
grinations of the transferred action but states that he is not required to obtain local counsel
in the district where the action is sent.
:9 18 U.S.C. §§ 3005, 3006A(b) (1976).
40 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1976).
4 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1976).
42 FED. R. CRiM. P. 44(a). There is no sixth amendment requirement that counsel be
imposed on a defendant who knowingly and intelligently wishes to proceed pro se pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976). Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
4' See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c). No pretrial conference may be held if the criminal defen-
dant is proceeding pro se.
" SECTION 2254 R. 6(a), 8(c), supra note 27; SECTION 2255 R. 6(a), 8(c), supra note 27.
45 SECTION 2254 R. 11, supra note 27 (referring to FED. R. CIv. P.); SECTION 2255 R. 12,
supra note 27 (referring to FED. R. Civ. P. or FED. R. CRIM. P., "whichever [the district
court] deems most appropriate. . . ").
48 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1976) (article 27, Uniform Code of Military Justice); 18
U.S.C. § 3005 (1976) (assignment of counsel, up to two, in capital or treason cases); 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976) (court may "request" attorney to represent indigents in civil or
criminal cases). There are other indigent representation provisions scattered throughout the
United States Code. Successful litigants may, of course, seek attorney fees from the oppos-
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civil and criminal procedure of the district and circuit courts, except in
general civil cases or where the client does not desire counsel. Neverthe-
less, no procedural rule of general application considers employment of
student practitioners.
The federal rules do contain provisions that enable individual courts
to sanction student practice. Both district and circuit courts may promul-
gate local rules of court that are not inconsistent with the rules adopted
by the Supreme Court and revised by Congress. In all cases not covered
by a particular rule, the courts may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with the general rules.47 Local rules must also be "rea-
sonable,"' 8 uniform and nondiscriminatory in order that no federal rights
are frustrated. 9 "[TIhe uniformity that was hoped for [in the relatively
new appellate rules] has been greatly compromised by the proliferation of
local rules for particular circuits."5 0 The same might to said for the dis-
trict court rules.
[T]he use of local rules has been extensive and they cover a great
variety of important matters. This in itself is a threat to uniform-
ity of procedure throughout the country, the local rules often pro-
vide "a series of traps" for lawyers from other districts, and the
very casual manner in which the judges in a district decide to
adopt a rule or set of rules is in striking contrast to the care with
which the Civil Rules themselves are made and amended. Every
study of experience with local rules has demonstrated how unsat-
isfactory it has been.51
ing party if their case falls within one of the exceptions to the "American rule" of not al-
lowing counsel fees as costs to the winner. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wil-
derness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975). Recently, the senate sought to provide attorney
fees in many classes of cases involving public law or in suits involving the government. See,
e.g., Equal Access to Justice Courts, S. 265, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (administrative agen-
cies); § 4 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412) (costs in civil actions). Award of counsel fees at the
conclusion of litigation may be another source of funding for a program, but these awards
are discretionary in most cases and chancy at best, as any divorce lawyer knows.
41 Several federal procedural rules state that regulation of practice in the absence of a
rule is subject to legislation. See FED. R. APP. P. 47; FED. R. Civ. P. 83; FED. R. CRIM. P. 57;
FED. R. PRAc. FOR TRIAL OF MINOR OFFENSES 11; FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b); FED. R. PRAC. FOR
TRIAL OF MINOR OFFENSES 11(b). This requirement also applies to the federal appellate and
civil rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976). Procedure is governed by the commands of the
Constitution as well. See generally Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931); 12
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 23, § 3153, at 228.
4' See Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co., 61 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
289 U.S. 740 (1933); 3 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 23, § 901, at
399.
" See Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1964); Spangler v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 42 Fed. 305, 306 (C.C.F. Mo. 1890); 3 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, supra note 23, § 901, at 399; Note, Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolu-
tion of a Federal Right, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 739-41 (1967).
" WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 104, at 521: 16 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
supra note 23, § 3993.
51 WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 62, at 294-95 (citing, inter alia, Woodham v. American
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Nevertheless, the local rule-making power has been the source of the nu-
merous published student practice rules.52 Use of a standard Model Rule
should mitigate this sort of criticism if it has been directed toward the
present melange of student practice rules.
The power of the court to suspend rules in a particular case on appli-
cation of a party or on its own motion and to direct proceedings by order
in the case provides another source of authority for adoption of a student
practice rule. This is a specific feature of the appellate rules53 and might
be fairly construed from provisions of the general rules." This authority
for student practice, on a case-by-case basis with individual approval
under the circumstances of each case, apparently is the basis for student
practice in the Seventh Circuit and a few district courts.5 5 This provision
was not, however, designed for widespread and consistent student advo-
cacy. It was included for "unusual or minor procedural problems that
arise. . . "56 and not for introduction of a new class of advocates into the
Cytoscope Co., 335 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1964)). See also 3 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, supra note 23, §§ 901, 400.
" See notes 5 & 6 supra.
" Enlargements of time are governed by FED. R. APP. P. 26(b). See also FED. R. APP. P.
2. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure cannot be construed to extend or limit subject
matter jurisdiction. FED. R. APP. P. 1(b). Additionally, neither a special order in a particular
case under FED. R. APP. P. 2 nor a local rule promulgated pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 47
may affect subject matter jurisdiction. This could be important in criminal defense situa-
tions if the "jurisdictional" language of the counsel cases is construed to equate student
practice with no representation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1939). This
should not present a difficulty if counsel is present at all critical stages as contemplated by
MODEL RULE §§ D(4)-D(9), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. See also id. at 3, 14-15. If
supervisory counsel adequately explains the role of the student advocate to the client, there
may be a knowing, intelligent waiver by the client of that aspect of representation handled
by the student, despite the admonition in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486-92 (1964),
that such waivers are not found lightly.
" The power of the Court to suspend rules and direct proceedings might be derived
from FED. R. Civ. P. 83's permitting district courts "[i]n all cases not provided by the rule,
... [to] regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." Rule 83's
grant of authority must be tempered with the admonition that the civil rules "shall be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R.
Civ. P. 1. FED. R. CRiM. P. 57(b) states that if the criminal rules do not have a specific
prescription, "the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules
or with any applicable statute." FED. R. CraM. P. 2 strikes themes similar to FED. R. Civ. P.
1: "These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceed-
ings. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration
and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDIST. LI-
TIG. R. 18 declares that practice in § 1407 cases "shall be that heretofore customarily fol-
lowed by the Panel" if not established by statute or rule. FED. R. APP. P. 47 contains lan-
guage similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 83 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) and therefore may be
redundant with aspects of FED. R. APP. P. 2.
55 See Collins Letter, supra note 5; Leleiko, supra note 5, at 926; [1972] REPORT PROC.
JUDIC. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES 53, quoted in FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10. Dis-
trict court rules which permit student practice on a case-by-case basis may include D. DEL.
R.
56 Statement of Edgar Tolan, PROCEEDINGS OF WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL
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federal judicial system. Approval of student participation on a case-by-
case basis57 would be acceptable in connection with pilot or innovative
projects but not for well-established programs certified under the Model
Rule. The rules-suspension provision of the federal appellate rules simi-
larly emphasizes a case-by-case approach.58
In addition to these rule-oriented provisions authorizing student prac-
tice through local rules or specific order, the federal courts have inherent
power to regulate practice, and who practices, in cases before them. The
same statute that confers the right to pro se representation" also states
that "parties may plead and conduct their own cases ... by counsel, as
by the rules of [the United States] courts, respectively, are permitted to.
manage and conduct causes therein."60 Although dictum in some deci-
sions would seem to suggest that admission to federal court practice is
derivative from admission to the state bar,61 Professor Cheatham was cor-
rect in stating that:
The authoritative source of the right to practice before federal
courts is federal law. This source may be somewhat obscured by
the fact that the federal courts ordinarily make membership in a
state bar a prerequisite to the privilege to practice before them
and treat disbarment of. a lawyer by a state court as reason for
any order to show cause why he should not be disbarred by the
federal court as well. This means only that the federal court bor-
rows and makes use of the state court action for its purposes, not
that it must follow state action.
2
RULES 129 (1938), quoted in 12 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 23, §§
3155, 902, 3993.
87 See note 53 supra.
58 See note 53 supra; 16 WmRHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 23, §
3948.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (pro
se representation constitutional).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976).
61 E.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547 (1968) (dictum, citing Theard); Theard v.
United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (dictum); cf. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 34, at
930-31 (disbarment by state does not automatically result in disbarment by Supreme
Court).
62 Cheatham, The Reach of Federal Action Over the Practice of Law, 18 STAN. L. REV.
1288, 1291 (1968), citied in United States Dist. Ct. v. Abrams, 423 U.S. 1038, 1038 (1975)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (denial of certiorari). See also Selling v. Redford, 243 U.S. 46, 49
(1917); Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1857); 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Note, Retaining
Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolution of a Federal Right, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 737-39
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Retaining Out-of-State Counsel]; Note, Out-of-State Attorney
not Admitted to Practice in State or Federal Courts of New York May Recover Reasonable
Value of Services Regarding Federal Claim, 55 GEO. L.J. 371, 373 (1966); but see Ex Parte
Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1883); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1873); Ex
parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1866); In re Rappoport, 558 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir. 1977); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 163 (3d Cir. 1975); Note,
Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1711, 1725 (1967).
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This reasoning has been borne out in pro hac vice and local counsel
cases.63 Although these decisions dealt with the right of a client to choose
his lawyer and the federal courts' decision whether the attorney should be
permitted to prosecute federal litigation, their principles apply to student
practice rules. Who practices before the federal bar, in what capacity and
under what limitations, is a matter for federal standards independent of
any state rules, no matter how apt or persuasive they may be. Conse-
quently, the contention of several federal student practice rules that stu-
dent activity under the rules is not a ground for a charge of the unautho-
rized practice of law" are nullities insofar as a charge under state law is
concerned.
As the preceding discussion has illustrated, there is ample authority
under federal statutes, the court's rule making authority, and their inher-
ent independent power to control who litigates cases before them, for the
"' In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975); Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241,
244-48 (5th Cir. 1968); Spanos v. Skouras Theaters Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 165-66, 170-71 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966); Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280, 285-86
(5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Bergamo, 154 F.2d 31, 34-35 (3d Cir. 1946). While these
cases are often encrusted with issues related to the relative unavailability of local lawyers in
civil rights cases or the sixth amendment right to counsel, they establish the federal court's
independent discretion to admit or eject lawyers in federal litigation. For a discussion of
discretion to control conduct of the specially-admitted lawyer, see United States v. Dinitz,
538 F.2d 1214, 1219-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); In re Rappaport, 558
F.2d 87, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1977). The attorney must have notice and an opportunity to be heard
if he is to be denied pro hac vice admission, however. In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007-08
(5th Cir. 1975). About the same number of federal district courts have local rules limiting
practice to locally-admitted lawyers or with locally-associated counsel. See Note, Constitu-
tional Right to Engage an Out-of-State Attorney, 19 STAN. L. Ray. 856, 863, 866 (1967);
text accompanying note 240 infra. The leading state court admission case is Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
Compare E.D.N.Y.R. 4.1, § 6, ("[Plarticipation by students under [this] rule shall
not be deemed a violation in connection with the rules for admission to the bar of any
jurisdiction concerning practice of law before admission to that bar,") with Spanos v. Skou-
ras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966) (appearance in
federal court by out-of-state attorney who failed to seek pro hac vice admission is unautho-
rized practice). Some commentators note that the states have penalized those not author-
ized to practice law by fine, imprisonment, injunction, or contempt, or denial of the fee. See,
e.g., Retaining Out-of-State Counsel, supra note 62, at 731 n.3; Note, Remedies Available
to Combat the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 501, 502, 518 (1962). D.
S.C. Order concerning legal assistance to indigents by law students explicitly states that
"[s]olicitation of representation of indigents at correctional institutions by any person sub-
ject to this rule shall constitute a violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics." But see
Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 615, 194 N.E. 313, 317-18 (1935), citied in Fleisher,
The Practice of Law by Law Students, in KITCH, supra note 15, at 125, 126. Fleisher notes
that "[iln a number of states, the doctrine has been rejected outright", but that the trend
seems to be toward not applying all the restrictions of commercial law practice to gratui-
tious provision of legal services. Id. at 136 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)).
The real question will come with the trend towards permitting student practice in compen-
sated cases, as articulated in the MODEL RULE and AMENDED ABA RULE § 1.
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federal courts to promulgate local rules authorizing law student practice.
III. Analysis and Commentary on the Model Student Practice Rule
In 1909, the Colorado legislature enacted the first student practice
rule.6 5 Subsequent rules have varied substantively, and federal rules
adopted since 1969 reflect the American Bar Association's Model Student
Practice Rule.66 The ensuing analysis, while referring to the Subcommit-
tee's Comments,67 will also compare the Committee's -Model Rule with
its antecedents, the ABA Rule and federal and state models that reflect
judicial, legislative and organized bar experience with student practice.
A. Statement of Purpose
The Purpose section of the Model Rule follows the pattern of other
federal procedural rules 8 in announcing the general goals of the sug-
gested regulation: "The following Model Rule for Student Practice is
designed to encourage law schools to provide clinical instruction in litiga-
tion of varying kinds, and thereby enhance the competence of lawyers in
practice before the United States courts. '6 9 The accompanying. Com-
65 COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-5-116 (1973), amplified by COLO. R. Civ. P. 226. The Univer-
sity of Denver has operated a legal aid dispensary since 1904. Merson, Denver Law Students
in Court: The First Sixty-Five Years, in KrrcH, supra note 15, at 138. In 1913, Harvard Law
School students organized a legal aid bureau in Cambridge. Toll, CLEPR from the View-
point of Legal Aid and Legal Services, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, surpa
note 2, at 17, 19. For other histories of early clinical experiments, see A. REED, PRESENT -
DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 217-21 (Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching, Bull. No. 21, 1918) (hereinafter cited as REED).
"Leleiko, supra note 5, at 915; KrrCH, supra note 15, at 228-31. As previously dis-
cussed, the ABA RULE has been amended recently to eliminte indigency as a status for
student advocate-assisted clients. See note 15 supra. Because no jurisdiction has amended
its ABA RuLE-based student practice provisions, this article will compare the 1969 version
of the ABA RUL. with the proposed MODEL RULE with references to the AMENDED ABA
RULE only where the latter would change the result.
67 The Subcommittee's Comments follow the text of each part of the MODEL RULE in
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-21.
"6 FED. R. Civ. P. 1, Scope, in addition to announcing which class of cases are governed
by the civil rules, states that they "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action." Similarly, FED. R. CRIM. P. 2, Purpose and Con-
struction, says that the criminal rules "are intended to provide for the just determination of
every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fair-
ness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay." FED. R.
EVID. 102 contains a similar policy statement: "These rules shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined." However, the Supreme Court, federal appellate, multis-
tate discovery and habeas corpus rules contain no such explicit statements.
85 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. Underlying the Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility's program has been the assumption that "clinical legal education
belongs in the law school-that all teaching and learning before practice are best done in an
educational institution." Pincus, Legal Education in a Service Setting, in CLINICAL EDUCA-
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ments note that student practice serves two ancillary objectives-service
to clients and the expedition of certain cases. 0 These stated purposes of
the Model Rule must, of course, be read in the context of other policies
and goals articulated in the Constitution,1 federal statutes,72 practice
rules,"3 and professional ethics that also govern the litigation process.
Furthermore, the Model Rule's encouragement of clinical instruction
must be considered in the context of its place in legal education.74 The
subcommittee very wisely did not attempt to inject an absolute standard
TION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 27. 38.
70 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. Commentators on clinical legal education have
articulated different goals and have debated the worth of fulfilling these objectives. Profes-
sor Kitch articulated these goals for the clinical program as skills training and the develop-
ment of a sense of professional responsibility, and provision of legal service, all contem-
plated by the MODEL RULE. An additional goal is socialization of law students to the
problems of poverty, an objective that is quite realizable under programs following the ABA
RULE. KITCH, supra note 15, at 13-19. The same themes are struck in Vetri, Educating the
Lawyer: Clinical Experience as an Integral Part of Legal Education, 50 OREGON L. REV. 57,
60-69 (1970). John Ferren lumps the first three of Professor Kitch's goals under the general
objective of teaching practical skills and adds a second, "gain[ing] understanding about the
behavior of ... governmental officials ... where there are noteworthy delegations of dis-
cretion and to evalute the impact of that discretion on people. . . " Ferren, Goals, Models
and Prospicts for Clinical - Legal Education, in KITCH, supra note 15 at 94, 95 (socializa-
tion to legal process); see also Silberman, Educational Trends and the Law, in CLEPR,
SELECTED READINGS, supra note 16, at 142, 144. Professor White, however, "saw no evidence
that the clinical experience teaches 'social awareness.'" White, The Anatomy of a Clinical
Law Course, inid, at 158, 171. He did see, however, an improvement in practical skills and
professional responsibility standards. Cf. Johnson, Education Versus Service: Three Varia-
tions on the Theme, in id. at 414 (goals of education and service are not incompatible).
As Professor Pye notes, the PACKER-EHRILCH REPORT, supra note 16, at 37-46, is dubi-
ous as to the merits of clinical education, and its stated goals, given the high cost of pro-
grams. Pye, On Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Educa-
tion as Methodology, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 21, 30-31. The
author expresses concern about the anti-intellectual aspects of clinical work, stating that
while it should not be the dominant or unique trend of legal education, it "has a useful role
to play." Id. See also Binder, Education Versus Service, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 2, at 35, 48 (stating that education of students is any training institution's
first, or primary concern). However, if the CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-7, is
adopted, it may signal a major shift in the attitudes of the law schools toward inclusion of
skills training in the curriculum, and from the pessimism of the PACKER-EHRLICH REPORT of
only eight years ago as to the wisdom of such an approach. See DEVITr REPORT, supra note
1, at 221.
7 See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965) (elaborating basic procedural
due process requirements for fair trial).
72 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976) (permitting pro se representation in United States courts).
See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (sixth amendment allows self-repre-
sentation in state courts).
73 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; FED. R. EvID. 102 (articulating general
goals). More specific goals, such as the seventh amendment right to civil jury trial, are incor-
porated in FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a). The Article III, § 2 and sixth amendment right to criminal
jury trial venue is incorporated in FED. R. CrIM. P. 18.
74 See note 16 supra.
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for quality or quantity of clinical programs in the law school curriculum.75
As recent surveys indicate, the size and content of clinical courses in
United States law schools outnumber the schools themselves.
76
The ABA Rule's Purpose section strikes the theme of the bar's re-
sponsibility to provide legal services for all, including those unable to pay.
The section states that one way to assist lawyers representing indigents is
through a student practice rule. Addition of such a rule would also "en-
courage law schools to provide clinical instruction in trial work of varying
kinds. '77 Although not explicit in the ABA Rule, the Model Rule's ancil-
lary objectives of serving clients and justice might be said to be met be
reference to the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility and Discipli-
nary Rules.78 The Model Rule expands the scope of encouraging clinical
instruction from just "trial work," the ABA Rule limitation, to the
broader phrase "litigation of varying kinds." The Model Rule thereby
avoids a potential jurisdictional objection to students' work in matters
attendent to trials such as pretrial hearings, discovery, arbitration, ad-
75 The problem of requiring specific instruction before certification for student clinical
practice under Model Rule § B is considered at text accompanying note 125 infra.
The Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules for Admission to Practice has proposed
that certain standards govern all law school clinical programs. See Advisory Committee on
Proposed Rules for Admission to Practice, Final Report, 67 F.R.D. 161 (1975). Considerable
controversy has surrounded these proposals. See, e.g., Craven, Leave Advocacy Alone, 62
A.B.A.J. 777 (1976); Devitt, Improving Federal Trial Advocacy, 72 F.R.D. 471, 473 (1977);
Frankel, Curing Lawyers' Incompetence: Primum Non Nocere, 10 CRFGHTON L. REv. 613,
623 (1977); Wellington, Legal Rights and Resources, YALE L. REP. 4, 5 (Spring, 1976). The
result has been a Federal Judicial Center study, which was requested by a United States
Judicial Conference Committee. The Committee has suggested pilot projects in selected dis-
trict courts for: a bar examination in aspects of federal practice and the ABA CoDE OF PRO-
FSSIONAL RESPONSwiLrrY; experience requirements prior to unconditional admission to
practice before federal courts; and, a peer or performance review procedure to advise and
give guidance to federal bar members whose performance has been substandard. The Com-
mittee has also recommended: adoption of a student practice rule; district court support of
continuing legal education programs; and, mandatory trial advocacy training in the law
schools. DEvTT REPORT, supra note 1, at 232-33. See also text accompanying notes 1-15
supra. Preliminary work of the Committee includes Devitt, Improving Trial Advocacy - 1I,
78 F.R.D. 251, 257 (1978); Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in
the Federal Court, Report and Tentative Recommendations of the Committee to the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, 79 F.R.D. 187 (1978).
78 See generally 1977-78 CLEPR SURVEY, supra note 3, at 1-118. Nine different models
for clinical education, four centering around a form of "legal aid clinic," have been identified
by John Ferren. Ferren, Goals, Models and Prospects for Clinical - Legal Education, in
KrrcH, supra note 15, at 94, 98-104. This categorization does not include the almost infinite
variety of individual schools' programs discussed in the CLEPR SURVEY. The Ferren catego-
ries do not include the model contemplated by the Rule: court-certified programs that must
be law school related.
7 Leleiko, supra note 5, at 993; KITcH, supra note 15, at 228 (emphasis added). Pre-
sumably "trial work" includes appeals. Since the MODEL RULE is not limited to any level of
court, presumably even the Supreme Court of the United States could adopt it. However, as
a result of its own three year experience rule, U.S. Sup. CT. R. 5.1, it is doubtful that the
Court will adopt a student practice rule.
78 See generally ABA CODE OF PRoFSssioNAL R.sPoNsBInLrrv, Canons 2, 4-8.
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ministrative proceedings, and, importantly, appeals and discretionary re-
view. The ABA Rule's Activities section might be interpreted to imply
such inclusivity but the Model Rule makes this authorization explicit.7 9
The 1979 amendments to the ABA Rule's Purpose section, while elimi-
nating the requirement that student-assisted clients be indigent by its in-
clusion of clients "from all walks of life," regrettably continues the trial
work limitation. The Amended ABA Rule also does not include the ancil-
lary objectives stated by the Model Rule's Comments."0
The Model Rule's Purpose section is therefore superior to the original
ABA rule and the Amended ABA Rule in its direct statement of purposes
for a student practice rule: improvement of the clinical aspect of legal
education and consequent enhancement of the quality of lawyers' practice
in federal court. This is a better policy than the ABA Rule's position that
law students should act as an auxiliary to help with indigent representa-
tion. A lawyer participating under the Rule will be a partner in building
and maintaining the national asset that is legal education, and not a mere
guide to show students where the courthouse is, or an employer of cheap
professional assistants.8 1 This goal must be compounded with the other
objectives of the profession - service to the client, the court and the law
- that unfortunately are buried as "ancillary objectives" in the Subcom-
mittee Comments.82 Federal courts considering adoption or amendment
of a student practice rule might well consider elevating these objectives
into the preambulatory Purpose.
With the exception of district court rules in Kansas and Montana, 3
which follow the ABA model, no federal court student practice rule con-
tains a statement of purpose. The law schools, however, have generally
7' See MODEL RULE § F; text accompanying notes 86-122 infra.
80 Compare AMENDED ABA RULE § I with ABA RULE § 1, in Leleiko, supra note 5, at
993; KITCH, supra note 15, at 228, and MODEL RULE § A, in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at
4. Acceptance of non-indigent cases was one of CLEPR's goals in 1973. See Pincus, Legal
Education in a Service Setting, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2,
at 27, 37.
81 See AALS, BYLAW 7, ASSOCIATION INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 9; Walker, Third
Year Student Practice Rules in Virginia: Notes for the Practitioner, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 69,
81 (1976), reprinted in 87 F.R.D. 220, 228-30 (1980).
82 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. There may be, of course, an inherent tension be-
tween the goals of service and quality legal education, as Dean Wilson notes in Clincial
Programs at Boston University School of Law, in KITCH, supra note 15, at 176, 185-87. The
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility sees no tension, except for argu-
ments from traditionalists who see legal education in a wholly academic setting. The Coun-
cil has stated that the "added [clinical] educational benefits are vested in the service set-
ting," thus envisioning a blend of the two factors. Accord, Johnson, Education Versus
Service: Three Variations on the Theme, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT,
supra note 2, at 414; Pincus, Legal Education in a Service Setting, in id. at 27, 28. CLEPR
has promoted the in-house clinic on the grounds that "experience has demonstrated that the
most effective model for clinical programs involves a law school running its own clinic."
Brickman, CLEPR and Clinical Education: A Review and Analysis, in id. 56, 77, (quoting
CLEPR, FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT 1968-1970, 33 (1971)).
83 D. KAN. R. § I; D. MONT. ORDER § I.
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adopted the philosophy that the student practice rules contemplate their
use in those areas of the curriculum where the rules serve a legitimate
education function." Since it makes explicit what was the implicit under-
standing of legal educators, this aspect of the Model Rule should be seri-
ously considered by the district and circuit courts that wish to revise or
adopt student practice rules. Behind the stated purposes, whether pub-
lished or articulated, must be a fundamental commitment to quality. A
clinical program "is valuable in direct proportion to the intensity and
depth of the student's participation in specific problems.... [T]he di-
viding line is whether the particular activity permits and demands thor-
oughness - excellence.1
8 5
B. Scope of Representation and Cases Under the Model Rule
Section F of the Model Rule, Activities, contemplates the broadest
possible range of clients, cases, and ancillary work connected with such
cases.
A certified student may under the personal supervision of his
supervisor:
1. represent any client including federal, state or local gov-
ernment bodies, if the client on whose behalf he is appearing has
indicated in writing his consent to that appearance and the super-
vising lawyer has also indicated in writing his approval of that
appearance;
2. represent a client in any criminal, civil or administrative
matter, however, the court retains the authority to limit a stu-
dent's participation in any individual case;
3. in connection with matters in this court, engage in other
activities on behalf of his client in all ways that a licensed attor-
ney may, under the general supervision of the supervising lawyer;
however, a student may make no binding commitments on behalf
of a client absent prior client and supervisor approval, and in any
matters, including depositions, in which testimony is taken the
student must be accompanied by the supervising lawyer. Docu-
ments or papers filed with the Court must be signed and read,
approved, and co-signed by the supervising lawyer. The court re-
tains the authority to establish exceptions to such activities.86
As section F's Comments points out, the wide range of opportunities for
student clinical practice "should greatly enhance [an enrolled] student's
practice skills upon graduation," thereby providing a more experienced
Leleiko, supra note 5, at 915 (quoting Dean Willard Pedrick of the Arizona State
University College of Law).
81 Fortes, The Training of the Practitioner, in THE LAW SCHOOL OF TOMORROW: THE
PROJECTION OF AN IDEAL 179, 188 (D. Haber & J. Cohen eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited as THE
LAW SCHOOL OF TOMORROW].
86 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-18.
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entry-level lawyer.87 While noting the historical emphasis of clinical pro-
grams on indigent representation, the Comments state that the Rule is
flexible enough to permit student representation of clients who, while not
technically indigent, are unable to retain private counsel because of a rel-
ative lack of funds or lack of financial return from the case. Thus, the
Rule envisions widespread student involvement in the
more traditional middle-class area of the law; [i.e.] commercial,
corporate, and financial questions. Representation of various gov-
ernmental bodies is authorized ... for similar reasons. It is im-
portant for student practice to teach a broad spectrum of legal
matters since many students may pursue careers in traditional
fields of law."
Section F's Comments note the possibility of individual local arrange-
ments that would permit student practice between graduation and admis-
sion to practice, "under the supervision of their new employers." 9 Since
section B of the Model Rule, Student Requirements, states in part that
"An eligible student must ... be enrolled in a law school," 0 representa-
tion and cases handled by the law graduate who is not admitted to the
bar must necessarily be subject of another rule or a general or pro hac
vice order by the court. Finally, the Comments add, "A court may wish to
authorize a dollar limitation in civil or administrative cases to respond to
concerns that student practice might divert fees from the private bar."9' 1
The ABA Rule would permit student representation in any indigent's
case before "any court or ... any administrative tribunal" with the cli-
ent's and counsel's consent. While the supervising lawyer does not need
to be in court for trial or any civil matter or any criminal matter that
does not require the assignment of counsel, 2 supervising counsel must be
present if the defendant is statutorially or constitutionally entitled to a
lawyer.9 Furthermore, the supervisor must be present for all appellate
oral arguments." An eligible law student may also represent the govern-
ment with approval of the head prosecuting attorney and the supervising
lawyer. In contrast to the Model Rule, the present ABA Rule would ex-
plicitly limit student participation to indigent's cases or criminal
prosecutorial matters, denying students the opportunity to handle mat-
ters outside the criminal law field or poverty-level clients.9 5 The amended
8? Id. at 18.
Id. at 20. With respect to dollar limitations on student fees, the MODEL RULE follows
the theme of several state rules, which allow student representation in a broad spectrum of
matters. Leleiko, supra note 5, at 926.
89 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
go Id. at 5.
Id. at 21.
' ABA RULE § II(A), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 993; KrrcH, supra note 15, at 228.
93 ABA RULE § V(B), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 995; KITCH, supra note 15, at 230.
I" ABA RULE § II(B), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 993-94; KITCH, supra note 15, at 229.
95 The ABA's student practice limitations are consistent with the ABA RULE'S Purpose.
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ABA Rule would permit student advocacy in compensated cases.9 6 The
Model Rule follows the latter position, permitting student representation
in all cases and litigation matters except those excluded by the client,
supervising counsel, or the court through its supervisory/certification
powers97 or perhaps the big case where fees might be diverted from the
private bar.98 In no instance may a student accept compensation for any
legal services. 9  While the ABA Rule anticipated the Supreme Court's
rule that defense counsel is required for all felony cases and misdemeanor
cases where confinement is imposed, 0 0 the Model Rule also requires pres-
ence of a supervising lawyer whenever "testimony is taken," a far safer
course. Presumably no law student could be imposed on a client if the
client voluntarily and intellegently elects to appear pro se.10 The Model
Rule does not explicitly address the issue of a client who wishes to be
represented by a student but not a lawyer. However, the requirements of
presence of the attorney -during testimony and his cosignature on all
pleadings, plus the rule requiring general supervision, would make such a
situation impossible because the student cannot function without super-
vising counsel under the Rule. The ABA Rule's Other Activities section
parallels the Model Rule provision that supervising counsel cosign all
pleadings prepared by a student advocate.'0 2 The ABA Rule would permit
unsupervised preparation of prisoners' postconviction petitions unless an
attorney of record or counsel is required.' 0 ' The Model Rule's blanket
cosignature requirement would presumably cover this class of documents
as well.
The themes, if not the literal language, of the ABA Rule have been
carried forward in many federal circuit and district court student practice
rules.' 04 All five circuits with formal rules permit student representation
in indigents' criminal appeals such as direct appeals or postconviction re-
liefs. The Third Circuit limits the student to "any civil rights or habeas
See ABA RULE § I, in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 993; KITCH, supra note 15, at 228.
AMENDED ABA RULE § I.
See MODEL RULE §§ E(1)(b), F(3), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14, 17; text
accompanying notes 123-172 infra.
, Comments to MODEL RULE § F, in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
"MODEL RULE § B(7), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5; accord, ABA RULE III(E),
in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 994; KITCH, supra note 15, at 229.
%00 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398-400 (1971); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
339-45 (1963). State rules, perhaps embodied in constitutions or statutes, may be broader
than federal right to counsel standards, but this will usually be of no concern for criminal
cases in the federal courts.
1*1 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-36 (1975); 28 U.S.C. § 1654- (1976).
102 Compare MODEL RULE § F(3), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-18, with ABA
RULE § V(A), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 995; KrrcH, supra note 15, at 230.
103 ABA RULE § V(A)(3), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 995; KITCH, supra note 15, at 230.
Sections II and V of the AMENDED ABA RULE are identical with the ABA RULE of 1969.
'1 Leleiko, supra note 5, at 916-19, summarizes permissible activities under the state
student practice rules.
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corpus matter." The First and Fourth Circuits come closest to the philos-
ophy of the Model Rule, allowing student assistance "in any [indigent's]
case."105 All these courts apparently permit student assistance with the
federal government's appellate criminal cases, with the Fourth and per-
haps the Second and Third Circuits allowing student work on other gov-
ernmental appeals as well.110 All these circuits require presence of counsel
at oral argument, and cosignature of all documents, although both the
District of Columbia Circuit and Third Circuit recognize that the lawyer
need not be present during preparation of briefs and other documents
which must be reviewed and signed by the lawyer before filing.10 7 Thus
the major changes for these circuits with respect to the scope of student
representation would be an expansion into the area of non-indigent cases
with respect to private clients, an explicit recognition by several circuits
of the potential for student involvement with governmental clients other
than the federal agencies, and a decision on classes of cases available for
students. To limit representation to habeas corpus and civil rights ap-
peals, as the Third Circuit does, may invite a return to the philosophy of
the forms of action. On the other hand, flinging wide the gates may pro-
voke unforeseen problems. The best governor on a too-broad delineation
of the kind of case a student may handle is the supervisor. If the attorney
knows his case and knows his students, there should be no problem with
a very broad rule on class of cases, since inadequate performance can re-
sult in malpractice liability as well as disciplinary action by the court or
the bar. There seems to be no reason why the federal appeals courts
should limit the classes of student-assisted clients by indigency or by
level of government. A civil rights case against a locality, a state, or the
federal government, for example, presents the same kind of problems and
the same levels of difficulty. Beyond the supervisor with his professional
self-interest is, of course, the general supervisory power of the court of
appeals.
108
The district court student practice rules are quite close to the content
of the Model Rule's Activities section. Over half the federal district court
105 D.C. Cm. R. 20(I)(a); 1ST CIR. R. 1(1); 2D CIR. SupP. R. § 46(e)(1); 3D CIR. R.
9(2)(I)(a); 4TH CIR. Supp. R. 13. The Seventh Circuit may limit appeals to indigents' cases
under professional supervison. See Leleiko, supra note 5, at 926.
,01 D.C. CIR. R. 20(I)(b) allows appearances on behalf of the Government. 2D CIR. SuPP.
R. § 46(e)(1) permits appearances "on behalf of ... the United States or a governmental
agency" which, otherwise unspecified, could be read to include state or local agencies. D.C.
CIR. R. 20(I)(d) and 3D CIR. R. 9(2)(I)(c) provide that a student "may engage in other activi-
ties under the general supervision of a member of the bar of this court ... for the purpose
of preparation of ... documents to be filed in this court, but such documents must be
signed by the supervising lawyer." This mirrors ABA RULE § V(A)(1), supra note 99, and
suggests that while the student could thus participate in other cases, he could not appear.
4TH CIR. Supp. R. 13 also allows appearance for the United States or a state with appropri-
ate written consent.
107 D.C. CIR. R. 20 (1)(d), 20 (I)(e); 1ST CIR. R. 1(2) 111(4); 2D CIR. Supp. R. §§
46(e)(2)(iv), 46(e)(4); 3D CIR. R. 9(2)(I)(c), 9(2)(I)(d); 4TH CIR. Supp. R. 13.
108 See text accompanying notes 19-64 supra.
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student practice rules allow the student advocate to handle any kind of
case, although the rules often specify or clearly imply indigent represen-
tation.1°0 The remainder of the local rules permit criminal work only.
Nearly all the district court rules require presence of counsel at all pro-
ceedings, thus anticipating the Model Rule provision. A few local rules
reflect the influence of the ABA Rule and do not require the attendance
of counsel in court when not mandated by law;110 one also states that a
supervising lawyer need not be present when depositions are taken.11
Several rules reflect the District of Columbia and Third Circuit's rules
that a lawyer need not be present during preparation of court papers, but
all district court rules speaking to the subject require the supervising law-
yer's cosignature on papers to be filed.112 A few rules limit the activities of
students within a particular case, such as no examination of witnesses or
no final arguments.1 '
The comments relating to the present circuit rules are applicable to
the district courts as well. As a general proposition, the Model Rule's re-
quirement that counsel be present" during any testimony applies with
more force at the district court level than in the more highly structured
context of one hour's oral argument on appeal. The record cannot be re-
written' if cross-examination or final argument is less than skillful in
the sharp adversarial process of a trial. For most clients, the case is won
or lost at trial. Even if an appeal is necessary to oveturn an erroneous
ruling of law that is more than harmless error,115 or that is not clearly
10 D. CONN. R. Civ. P. 26(1), 26(3)(d), 26(4); D. DEL R. 4(B), (incorporating by refer-
ence Da. S. CT. R. 55(a) and DEL. BD. BAR ExAMINERS R. 55.2(d)); N.D. GA. R. 71.911(1);
D. HAWAI R. 1(k)(1); D. IDAHO R. 2(g), para. 4, 5 (incorporating by reference IDAHO S. CT. R.
123A, 123C(1)); S.D. IowA RULE §§ 2, 3; D. KAN. R. §§ II(A), 2(B); E.D. LA. R. 21.12(a),
21.13(b); M.D. LA. R. 1J(1)(a) - 1J(1)(d); D. ME. R. 8(d)-8(f); N.D. Miss. STUDENT PRACTICE
RULE §§ 1(a) - 1(c); D. MONT. ORDER § 2(a); D. NEB. R. 5(M)(2); D. NEB. R. 5(N)(2) (defense
of civil cases only); D.N.H.R. 5(c); E.D.N.Y.R. 4.1(1), 4.1(4); N.D.N.Y. SPEC. R. No. 1, §§ 1,
4; N.D. OHIO R. 2.10; D.S.C. ORDER; S. DAK. R. 2, §§ 8.4-8.6; W.D. TENN. R. 1(a)(1); E.D. VA.-
R 7(L)(I)(A)-(N)(I)(B), 7(L)(IV); W.D. VA. THR YEAR PRACTICE RULE I(A)-I(B), IV.
110 D. CONN. R. Crv. P. 26(2)(d) (attendance required but may be waived); D. DEL R.
4(b) (incorporating by reference DEL. BD. BAR EXAMINERS R. 55.2(d)(i)-55.2(d)(iii)); N.D.
GA R. 71.911; D. IDAHO R. 2(i) (attendance may be waived by client, student advocate, and
judge); E.D. PA. R. 9 1/ § I(A) (attendance with the court's liscretion); D.S. DAK. R. 2 § 8.4.
m E.D. PA. R. 9 2 § I(A)(1); contra, E.D.VA. R. 7(L)(IV)(B); W.D. VA. THIRD YEAR
PRACTiCE RULE IV(B).
11 D. CONN. R. Civ. P. 26(4)(b); D. DEL. R. 4(B) (incorporating by reference DEL. BD.
BAR ExAmNERs R. 55.2(f)); D.D.C.R. 2-9(a)(3); N.D. GA. R. 71.941; D. HAwAI R. 5(a)(1); D.
IDAHO R. 2(g) (incorporing by reference IDAHO S. CT. R. 123 (D)(1) - 123(D)(2)); D. KAN. R.
§§ V(A); D. ME. R. 8(f); N.D. MISS. STUDENT PRACTICE R. § 5(b); E.D. Mo. R. 26 (incorpo-
rating by reference Mo. S. CT. R. 13.04(a)(1)-13.04(a)(2)); D. MONT. ORDER 2(c); E.D.N.Y.R.
4.1(4)(b); N.D.N.Y. SPEC. R. No. 1, § 4(b); D.S.C. ORDER; D.S. DAK. R. 2 § 8.6; E.D. VA. R.
7(L)(IV)(A)(1)-7(L)(IV)(A)(3); W.D. VA. THIRD YEAR PRAcTICE RULE IV(A)A(1)-(V(A)(8).
,,3 E.g., N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 41; E.D. Mo. R. 26.
214 See People v. Perez, 82 Cal. App.3d 89, 147 Cal. Rptr. 34, 42 (Cal. App. 1978), va-
cated, 24 Cal.3d 133, 145-46, 594 P.2d 1, 9, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176, 184 (1979).
115 See FED. R. Civ. P. 61; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
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erroneous, 116 a badly built record can wreck chances of success at the cir-
cuit level. Aside from the possibility of a subsequent accusation of inef-
fective representation if the quality of lawyering is upgraded,1 7 or in a
situation where new rules for presence of counsel are made retroactive,"
5
2
the absence or perfunctory performance of counsel will lower the public's
estimate of the courts and the legal profession. Such conduct also might
invite a complaint to the organized bar, a professional negligence claim or
suit," e or a postconviction petition in the appropriate case. The Model
Rule's cosignature by counsel requirement for papers to be filed, and its
requirement that settlements be done in the lawyer's presence, 120 are ad-
ditional insurance of competent representation while fulfilling the lawyer-
student team's duty to the court. Of course, the general cure for poor
performance is thorough preparation by the supervising lawyer.
Permitting student participation in any kind of case, for any kind of
client, should be the rule, with exceptions and limitations imposed by su-
pervising counsel, based on his experience and preparation and that of
the student, and ultimately by the courts through their supervision/certi-
fication authority. District Courts contemplating a student practice rule
should consider the Model Rule's Activities section, and those courts al-
ready permitting student practice might revise their procedures to con-
form with this part of the Model Rule.
The Model Rule, the ABA Rule, and present federal practice rules all
contemplate a multistage screening process for student advocacy in a par-
ticular case or class of litigation. As a primary ethical matter, by parity of
reasoning with the Code of Professional Responsibility,'2 ' the student
should be confident of his own ability to handle a case. The client must
express confidence by consent. The law school and the supervisor must
certify the individual student's competence. Finally, the judge must be
satisfied that a given class of cases are suitable for student assistance, and
that a particular student is competent for the case he or she tries. 2 2 This
multi-party screening need not, indeed should not, be a formal inquisition
on each case for each student, but this sort of in-depth screening ought to
eliminate professional incompetence claims.
118 See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
17 See generally Marzulo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (imposing standard on range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases and replacing farce and mockery standard of Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d
1, 3 (4th Cir. 1965)). As Mr. Justice White's dissent to denial of certiorari in Marzullo indi-
cates, the federal constitutional standard varies among the circuits. 435 U.S. at 1011-13.
1i8 See generally Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971).
'9 See, e.g., Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
120 One district court student practice rule permits settlements with no attorney pre-
sent. D. HAWAII R. § 5(a)(1).
121 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILTY, Canon 6; EC 6-3, DR 6-101(A).
122 Klein, The Courtroom as Classroom: The View from the Bench in CLEPR CONFER-
ENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 91, 95.
STUDENTS IN U.S. COURTS
C. Eligibility and Certification of Law Students
Section C of the Model Rule, Student Requirements, contains limita-
tions and requirements for students who wish to participate in a federal
advocacy program. These limitations and requirements are both more lib-
eral and more restrictive than other models:
An eligible student must:
1. be duly enrolled in a law school;
2. have completed at least three Semesters of legal studies, or
the equivalent;
3. have knowledge of the Federal Rules of Civil & Criminal
Procedure, Evidence, and the Code of Professional Responsibility;.
4. be enrolled for credit in a law school clinical program
which as been certified by the court;
5. be certified by the dean of the law school, or the dean's
designee, as being of good character and sufficient legal ability,
and as being adequately trained, in accordance with paragraphs
1-4 above, to fulfill his responsibilities as a legal intern to both his
client and the court.
6. be certified by the court to practice pursuant to this Rule;
7. not accept personal compensation for his legal services
from a client or other source.2
2 3
Section E(1) elaborates on student certification requirements:
a. Certification by the law school dean and approval by the
court shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, and unless it is sooner
withdrawn, shall remain in effect until expiration of 18 months;
b. Certification to appear in a particular case may be with-
drawn by the Court at any time, in the discretion of the Court,
and without any showing of cause.
1 2 4
Section B's Comments stress that a student must have completed "the
core legal courses" so that the advocate will recognize the legal issues per-
tinent to representing a client. Federal practice requires "working famili-
arity" with the federal rules of procedure and evidence and "an under-
standing of professional responsibilities. '125 Aside from these subject
123 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
124 Id. at 15.
125 Id. at 5-6. The semantics of MODEL RuLE § B(3) and the Comments are slightly
confusing. The Rule requires "knowledge of the Federal Rules of Civil & Criminal Proce-
dure, Evidence ... "while the Comments seem to explain that a working familiarity with
the federal civil and criminal rules, and the federal rules of evidence, rather than formal
courses, satisfy the MODEL RuLs Comments' statement that "[n]o specific required aca-
demic courses are incorporated into the Rule.. . . " FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. The
phrase of MODEL RuLE B(3) might be rewritten to read "Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence," for clarity. As noted infra, the circuit courts
of appeals or those with specialty jurisdiction such as the Court of Claims might wish to
substitute or add citation to their rules. See text accompanying notes 170-182 infra. The
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areas, the Rule purports to require no specific academic program. "[S]uch
knowledge will be assured by certification." The only intrusion into cur-
riculum planning is the three-semester rule, during which the student
should have completed his principal legal courses. "This should be ac-
complished when a student has completed three semesters ... of his le-
gal education." The motivation and interest of a student counts more
than academic averages, according to the Comments:
The opinion of supervisors charged with administering student
practice programs is that a student's motivation and interest in
litigation practice, client concerns, and proper supervision are
more determinative of his success as a student practitioner than
his academic record. Accordingly, grades are not sine qua non of
the program. However, faculty may choose to refuse admission to
clinical practice any student who has done particularly poorly in
subjects which are directly involved [with] and relevant to clinical
work.
126
Whether graded or pass-fail, the practical nature of student practice
likely will promote more diligence, better and improved work habits, and
less of a lethargic attitude among upper-class students. These benefits
will inure despite the fact that student practice probably would not
change character attributes considered bad for the legal profession. 1
Whatever be the method for choosing among students for the program -
whether it be tied to grades, random selection, other criteria, or a combi-
nation - it should be fair and perceived as fair. 2
In evaluating student advocacy projects, the Comments to section F of
the Model Rule, Activities, would seem to urge a pass/fail system:
A crucial aspect of learning to be effective in court is the transi-
tion to focusing on the client's rights rather than the student's
grade - the later focus being inculcated by years of academic
experience. This transition can take place most fruitfully under
Code, like the curriculum of law schools, may no longer be considered as cast in stone for all
eternity, and insertion of this specific requirement may be ambiguous. See text accompany-
ing notes 145-154 infra.
As noted in its Introduction, the CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9 at 27, is "opposed to
suggestions that the face or direction of the movement [to improve lawyer training] be
closely shaped through regulatory measures" such as mandatory courses. The MODEL RuLE'S
policy is reflected in the D.vrrr REPORT'S recommendation that the ABA accreditation stan-
dards be amended to include a required course in trial advocacy for all law schools. D.vrr
REPORT, supra note 1, at 228-29. The Model Rule's policy is also reflected in the rules of
certain courts in prescribing curriculum requirements and limitations and in the law
schools' traditional policy of prerequisites for advanced courses, including clinical work. See
Leleiko, supra note 5, at 934.
26 FINA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6.
" CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 16-17.
, See, e.g., Wilson, Clinical Programs at Boston University School of Law, in KITCH,
supra note 15, at 176, 179.
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program supervision, because the supervisor is not dependent
upon the cases he takes for his salary and, therefore, can devote
his time and focus on teaching students advocacy skills, yet main-
tain complete fidelity to the clients' interests. 12 9
The logic of this passage, considered in the context of the Model Rule's
stated Purpose, to encourage law schools to "provide clinical instruction
. ..and thereby enhance the competence of lawyers,"13 0 would appear to
be faulty. While service to clients is an ancillary objective of the Model
Rule," the Comments quoted above would appear to ignore the reality
that fees, salary raises, elevation to partnership and similar perks supply
much of the encouragement for quality performance in the law office.
Similarly, graded work and the ultimate awarding of a law degree prompt
superior performances from law students. 3 2 Despite a preference for un-
graded advocacy, the Comments leave "[t]he question of the means of
grading student practice ... entirely up to the respective law school."" s
The most recent study indicates that as a result of law schools' return to
a more traditional "back-to-basics" approach," 4 student clinical work
may be headed more toward grading rather than credit/no credit, or at
least toward more comprehensive evaluations."35 Early studies demon-
strated a bias in favor of graded evaluations."36 Indeed, the latest CLEPR
129 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
120 MODEL RULE § A, in id. at 4.
:1 Id.
122 See Pincus, Legal Education in a Service Setting, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE
LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 27, 30.
I" FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
3 See generally Carr, Grading Clinical Law Students, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 223, 223
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Carr].
128 The FINAL REPORT cites COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY, SURVEY AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 1976-77 x-xi (1977), to show
that 62 percent of clinical instructors used pass/fail for student advocates, and that 71 per-
cent of the programs employed supervision evaluations of the work product rather than
written or oral examinations, papers, or evaluations by others. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1,
at xi-xiii, noted that credit/no credit grading had slipped to 59 percent, while supervision
evaluation had risen to over 73 percent of total clinical programs. Grading clinical perform-
ance may be difficult because of the close personal relationships involved and the necessity
of evaluating individual performances. White, The Anatomy of a Clinical Law Course in
KrrCH, supra note 15, at 158, 168; Subin, Directing and Managing Legal Education in a
Service Setting, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 57, 63-64. The con-
troversy over graded or pass-fail standards, and class standings in general, is not a recent
phenomenon in legal education. See, e.g., W. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE
CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 80-82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON]. It would
seem that if grades are assigned for signed papers perhaps in lieu of an examination, or oral
argument or individual briefs in moot court cases, they can also be assigned for clinical work
too. As the 1977-78 CLEPR SuRvEY, supra note 3, at xii, points out, the key is good objec-
tive evaluation procedure. This is true for traditional academic courses or professional work
in any calling. The armed, civil and foreign services have employed efficiency or fitness re-
ports for decades, and nearly every institutional employer has some kind of standardized
evaluation.
126 See Carr, supra note 134, at 223.
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Survey would urge objectivity, and therefore a graded system, "rather
than signalling academic inferiority to students and employers by contin-
uing the credit/no credit concept. 1 3 7 Andrew S. Watson, a professor of
law and psychiatry, expresses a similar view:
"[M]uch of this discussion about grading stems from a kind of
magical effort to eliminate the fact of competition in order to
control where we will be placed in it .... [T]he reality of ambi-
guity [in a pass-fail system] will ... reincarnate the same con-
flict, and the state of anxiety [will exist] anew. This situation is
another example of how classroom circumstances, with their emo-
tional elements, can be analogized to law practice - in this case
the matter of work product"1las
These comments are applicable to clinical practice circumstances as well.
The choice is therefore whether the student should face the trauma of
objective fair evaluation for his work within the spectrum of a grade scale
or the trauma of not knowing where he stands within that scale, assuming
he would pass, in a clinical program. The former seems to be the lesser
evil.
Section B's final Comments note that Model Rule section B(4)'s
phrase "law school clinical program" includes cooperative programs of
two or more law schools.239 Thus, law schools might form a consortium of
clinical programs for more efficient management, as the District of Co-
lumbia schools have, or permit cross-registration of students, particularly
during the summer months, as they do in traditional summer school pro-
grams. The internal arrangement of any clinical program, whether it be a
consortium, a totally in-house project supervised in a professor's office, or
a teaching law firm within the law school, 40 is left to the law schools
subject to court certification.
"Certification of the student ... reflects the concept that the court is
ultimately responsible for . . . students permitted to practice before it.
... Students should be required to abide by the same standards as...
if fully admitted attorneys, including full adherence to the Code of Pro-
13 1977-78 CLEPR SURVEY, supra note 3, at xxii-xxiii.
"' Watson, On Teaching Lawyer Professionalism: A Continuing Psychiatric Analysis,
in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 139, 150-151; see also Beck
& Burns, Anxiety and Depression in Law Students: Cognitive Intervention, 30 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 270 (1979).
I'l FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. Snyman, supra note 16, urges a nationwide linkup
of Legal Services Corporation ofices and law school clinical programs. The Chief Justice has
praised the Northeastern-Harvard linkup. Burger, supra note 9, at 296.
140 See Stern, Delivery of Legal Service: Clinical Education and Group Legal Services,
in CLINCIAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 214, 220 (referring to Frank,
Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. Rnv. 907 (1933)). Other schools, such as
Santa Clara, employ the teaching law firm approach. Allison, Delivery of Legal Services and
Other Improvements in the Machinery of Justice, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 2, at 46, 52.
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fessional Responsibility. 1 41 This part of the Comments to section E(1) of
the Model Rule deserves two remarks.
First, it is presumed that the phrase "the same standards as . . . if
fully admitted attorneys" means fully admitted attorneys who have been
recently admitted and have minimum competence, or that the law stu-
dents must perform within the range of competence142 expected of attor-
neys in that kind of case. The "same standards" phrase should not be
construed as requiring the level of performance of a fully experienced,
"fully admitted" lawyer. This construction of the phrase underscores the
need to have fully qualified supervisory counsel in student-assisted cases.
With qualified counsel, the net combined representation should be equal
or superior to the minimal competence required for the particular case.
Experience has shown that properly supervised and trained clinical advo-
cates "can be relied on ... to protect the client's interests very well" in
the sorts of matters that commonly have come to legal aid offices. 143 Be-
cause the Rule emphasizes familiarity with legal ethics and professional
responsibility, the student (and his supervisor) should be held to the gen-
eral standards of the practicing bar.
14 4
The second point concerns the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Presumably the Comments are referring to the American Bar Associa-
tion-sponsored Code which replaced the Canons of Ethics. If so, local var-
iants of the Model Rule might identify it as such. The further difficulty is
that there is no standard form or unified interpretation of the Code that
governs in all jurisdictions,1 4 5 and the Model Rule is not clear as to which
Code should apply - the state Code in which a district court sits, a "uni-
form" federal Code that takes a Restatement approach 4 or which among
several states' Codes a federal tribunal should apply in a multistate case.
Although this is, hopefully, a theoretical issue such that no ethical
problems will arise, the Model Rule should be more specific as to choice
of law in the event that there is an ethics issue. One approach would be
lex fori - a statement that the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
:41 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16.
,4 See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1011 (1978).
14' Ferren, Goals, Models and Prospects for Clinical - Legal Education, in KITCH,
supra note 15, at 94, 117.
14 See Fleisher, The Practice of Law by Law Students, in KITCH, supra note 15, at 125,
134.
'4 See generally Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Reiponsibilityl,
Symposium, Reflections on a Decade Under the Code of Professional Responsibility: The
Need for Reform, 57 N.C.L. Rav. 497, 514-16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
148 A Restatement format is anticipated for the new Code of Professional Repson-
sibility. Introduction to Symposium, supra note 145, at 495. The new MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT are summarized in Proposed Ethics Rules: A Try for "Balance", 66
A.B.A.J. 277-79 (1980). The rules have been published in ABA COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION
oF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft,
Jan. 30, 1980). They have not been approved by the ABA House of Delegates and, conse-
quently, do not constitute ABA policy.
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applied and interpreted by the state wherein the federal trial will or has
been held will govern any disciplinary action. Such an approach would
parallel the Klaxon principle for diversity cases. 17 This would solve the
trial and appellate court problem in all but the multistate cases, where
the court might wish to use an interest approach or take the view that the
highest standard among several choices should prevail. Although this ap-
proach cuts against the concept of federal standards for admission to the
federal bar urged above, it might be justified on the theory of a federal
admission rule for student practice combined with employment of state
disciplinary standards for student advocates once admitted.14 If the
Model Rule is adopted as proposed, the federal court could fashion a fed-
eral standard of ethics upon a theory of needed uniformity, a theme simi-
lar to the one underlying federal common law,149 the criticism of Klaxon
and similar cases, 150 or cases in which the Constitution8 or federal stat-
utes govern.152 This authority might derive from the rules and case law
allowing the federal courts to admit to practice, disbar or discipline law-
yers.153 An alternative approach is a generalization of the ethical stan-
dards requirement, omitting reference to a specific Code and allowing
judges to fashion their own standards for the federal courts. This kind of
standard leaves uncertainty in an area where counsel often needs a
benchmark or a warning before acting, however. One judge has observed
that "law students are more of a danger to themselves," (i.e. committing
ethics violations reflecting on their fitness to practice) "than they are to
their clients or to the court." " While this may be true in some cases,
student misconduct, like lawyer or judicial misconduct, will reflect unfa-
vorably on the public's perception of the bar, the judiciary, and the judi-
cial process. The Model Rule therefore wisely emphasizes certification of
knowledge of professional ethics norms. The question of which norms are
applicable, however, is an equally important issue and should be clarified.
147Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
148 See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (applying federal copyright
statutes but looking to state law to determine whether "children" included illegitimate off-
spring). See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477-80 (1979) (comparing De Sylva with
federal common law policy in Textile Wkrs. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957)).
149 See generally Wmo~rr, supra note 5, § 60; 1A MooRE's supra note 26, 0.318. "Fed-
eral courts appear to use the Code as a source of law rather than law per se." Patterson, A
Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Legal Ethics, in Symposium, supra note 145, at
519, 520 n.6.
180 See generally WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 57; 1A MooRE's, supra note 26, § 0.311; see
also Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 234-42 (2d Cir. 1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge
Clark's dissent has claimed the support of the commentators if not the courts. See WRIGHT,
supra note 3, § 64, at 304.
15 See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977).
152 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976) (allowing party to proceed pro se in federal courts,
thereby rendering CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REPONSmIBJLrrY largely inoperative).
'5 See text accompanying notes 19-85 supra.
' Greene, Judging the Students: Judicial Attitudes on Student Practice, in CLINiCAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 262, 275.
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The Comments to section E(1) of the Model Rule assert that
[c]ertification and revoking power should provide an entirely suf-
ficient means of discipline over student practitioners. Later ad-
mission to the bar may also be considered to be at stake, since
indications of lack of competent and ethically responsible conduct
in student practice might impinge on the student's admission to
the bar. Accordingly, the student practitioner is under considera-
ble disciplinary sanctions should they prove necessary. Also, the
law school may have other disciplinary powers.155
Among the "other disciplinary powers" the law school has over a student
advocate are graded evaluations, class standing, failure to pass the clinical
course in a credit/no credit program, reprimands on the student's record,
suspension or expulsion from law school, or even refusal to award the de-
gree. The supervisor's assumption of "full personal professional responsi-
bility" for student work, his duty to "assist and counsel the student," to
train him properly and protect the client, and his responsibility "to sup-
plement... work of the student as necessary to ensure proper represen-
tation of the client"1 56 are not disciplinary checks. However these supervi-
sory responsibilities, coupled with personal leadership and whatever
grading authority the lawyer has, enable the lawyer to impose proper
sanctions if such be necessary. The lawyer retains his duty to the client
and the court as well as legal education, and through these he might be
compelled to report student infractions to the court or the law school
dean for appropriate action. The bar's influence on certification and
decertification might be increased if the Comments' suggestion that the
process be delegated to a subcommittee of the court's bar committee is
implemented.15 7
The supervision requirements of the clinical attorney have been dis-
cussed in section I B of this article.153 The Model Rule also requires
that the attorney "supervise concurrently no more than ten students car-
rying clinical practice as their entire academic program, with a propor-
tionate increase in the number of students as their percentage of time
devoted to clinical practice may be less." The supervising lawyer must
also be admitted to practice in the court where the student is certified.159
The ten-student rule has been widely recognized as the norm for a full-
time clinical professor whose advocates also devote all their time to the
155 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. Other writers have noted that a record of with-
drawal of a student's certification "would surely raise grave doubts when the student subse-
quently applied for admission to a bar." Fleisher, The Practice of Law by Law Students, in
KrrCH, suipra note 15, at 125, 135; accord, Comment, Student Practice - Limited Appear-
ances in Court by Third Year Law Students, 6 U. RiCH. L. REv. 152, 162 (1971).
'" MODEL RULE §§ D(7)-D(9), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 17.
,5 See text accompanying notes 100-106 supra.
, MODEL RULE §§ D(2), D(6), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
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program. 160 The sliding-scale aspects of the Rule will be helpful to those
adjuncts or full-time faculty who assist with a few cases while maintain-
ing a practice or teaching classes. As the Comments put it,
[t]he student/supervisor ratio is crucial to the quality of educa-
tion and service provided by student practice. If the supervisor
has too many students under the given circumstances, he will be
overworked and his ability to provide training as well as control
over the student will likely diminish accordingly. The ratio of stu-
dents per supervisor should vary according to such factors as
whether the supervisor is full or part-time, and by the nature of
the case, i.e., whether it is .a trial or appellate case, or a criminal
or civil one. Thus, for example, criminal and trial cases will re-
quire more supervision and thus fewer number of students per
supervisor. Private attorneys authorized as supervisors should su-
pervise no more than three students."6'
The Model Rule thus echos state provisions for limiting the number of
student advocates that can be supervised by one lawyer, 102 and presaged
the Cramton Report's insistence that general skills training in legal edu-
cation "demand[s] a radically lower student-faculty ratio than the stan-
dard law school course (approximately 6-1 or 10-1 rather than 20-1 or
higher)."'16 The Model Rule Comments also state that the supervisor
must be competent and seasoned in practice, perhaps by requiring a min-
imum time requirement, thereby echoing the "Clare" philosophy."" "A
federal court should not certify a program unless it is satisfied that the
program's supervisors have adequate experience. Besides practical experi-
ence, supervision abilities such as patience, a willingness to commit a
great amount of time and energy, as well as organizational and scheduling
abilities are imperative." 65
The ABA Rule and nearly all student practice rules limit programs to
160 White, The Anatomy of a Clinical Law Course, in KITCH, supra note 15, at 158, 168-
69; Shapo, An Internship Semiar for Law Students: A Test of Theory, A Critique of Prac-
tice, 46 TEx. L. REv. 479, 490, 493 (1963). Professor Kitch states that "[t]wenty seems to be
about the upper limit for supervision by a single clinical teacher." Kitch, Foreward, in
KITCH, supra note 15, at 21. Perhaps he was referring to a clinical lawyer or professor's load
where each student carries only one case. Even so, the author's experience with teaching a
full academic course plus handling clinical appellate cases indicate that 10 students would
be plenty, and 20 an enormous burden. The medical school's experience in the context of a
full-time supervising doctor who teaches one area of medicine is a 1:1 to 1:4 ratio. Crezer &
Glaser, Clinical Teaching in Medicine: Its Relevance for Legal Education, in id. at 77, 83-
84, 88.
1$1 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
162 See Leleiko, supra note 5, at 922-23.
163 CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 23; see also AALS BYLAWS, art. 6, § 6-1(4)(b), in
AssOCIATION INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 22-24 (critical of high student-faculty ratios in
instructional courses).
16 See note 75 supra.
165 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
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third year students with a time limit for certification. These Rules also
restrict student advocacy programs to American Bar Association-ap-
proved schools, and do not have specific subject-area requirements or a
court certification procedure. The ABA Rule and the Model Rule require
certification by the law school dean that the student has good character
and competent legal ability and is adequately trained to perform as a le-
gal intern. Both Rules declare that the student may not ask for or receive
compensation or remuneration from a client, although the supervisor or
the program may be paid from other sources. The ABA Rule permits
compensation to the student from other sources, but the Model Rule does
not. The ABA Rule also requires that the student be introduced to the
Court by his supervisor"1s Except for a new requirement that the student
certify his familiarity with the ABA "Code of Professional Responsibility
... or the applicable rules of conduct promulgated by the agency having
jurisdiction under state law," the Amended ABA Rule's student certifica-
tion provisions are identical with the 1969 version of the ABA Rule.267
The rules adopted by the five courts of appeals which permit student
practice generally track the 1969 ABA formula. Several circuits have ad-
ditional requirements, however. The District of Columbia Circuit adds a
requirement for enrollment in a clinical program; the First Circuit, enroll-
ment in an appellate advocacy course for credit; the Second Circuit, the
requirement of a student advocate's oath; and all but the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, a student's filed certification of familiarity with the Code
of Professional Responsibility or the Canons of Ethics.168 The district
court rules also follow the 1969 ABA patterns, with a number of varia-
tions relating to amount of legal education before eligibility for student
practice and the advocate's certification of familiarity with ethical stan-
dards and occasionally procedure. Other variations include the require-
ments of evidence or other subjects, prescription of a student intern's
oath, and a few limitations to local law school students' participation.169
"' Compare MODEL RULE §§ B(7), C(4), in id. at 5, 7 with ABA RULE III(E), in Leleiko,
supra note 5, at 994; KrrcH, supra note 15, at 229.
07 Compare AimND ABA RuLE § III with ABA RULE § III, in Leleiko, supra note 5,
at 994; KITCH, supra note 15, at 229.
l2S D.C. CmR. R. 20(11), (III); 1ST Cm. R.11 (requiring certification of familiarity with
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and court's supplement rules); 2D CIR. Supp. R. §
46(e)(3); 3n CL. R. (II), 9(2)(mI); 4TH Cm. R. 13(a)-13(f). Student eligibility under state
rules follows the ABA pattern with additional course requirements in many instances. See
Leleiko, supra note 5, at 921-22.
"' Local variants and exceptions are summarized after each local rule. See, e.g., D.
CONN. R. Civ. P. 26(3) (permitting practice after year of law school); D. DEL. R. 4(b) (incor-
porating .by reference DEL. Sup. CT. R. 55 and DEL. BD. BAR Ext mNERS R. 55.2(a)-55.2(c),
55.2(e) and adding Delaware residency requirement); D.D.C.R. 2-9(b) - 2-9(c); N.D. GA. R.
71.92-71.93 (adding oath or affidavit requirement, certification of familiarity with rules of
court and ABA CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY, and completion of courses in evi-
dence and civil and criminal procedure); D. HAwAu R. §§ 1(a), 3(a), 4, 7(a) (limiting pro-
gram to University of Hawaii Law School students, prescribing an oath, and limiting disci-
pline to decertification); D. IDAHo R. 2(g) §§ 2, 3, 6 (incorporating by reference IDAso Sup.
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The federal circuit and district rules therefore point up the differences
between the Model Rule and its ABA predecessor. Most federal courts
limit participation to law students who have completed two-thirds of
their academic work. This stage, which usually comes before the second
summer, is the prime time for a clerkship or clinical experience. Other
courts admit students after three semesters and a few after only one year
of law school, no doubt reflecting nearby schools' curriculums or com-
bined with severely restricted courtroom activities authorized for stu-
dents. Some courts independently certify students, in addition to recom-
mendations or certifications by the dean and the supervisor. A strong
minority of courts require student familiarity with civil procedure, crimi-
nal procedure, federal evidence, and most often, legal ethics, thereby an-
ticipating the Model Rule provisions. Almost all courts limit participation
CT. R. 123(A), 123(D)(4), 123(D)(6), 123(E); also providing for court certification and decer-
tification, and prior participation under supervision before student appearance alone in
petty offenses cases); N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 41 (one-year course completion rule but limited
courtroom participation); S.D. IOWA R. I (incorporating by reference IOWA SuP. CT. R. 120
(3), admitting students after three semesters, and tying admission to a supreme court-ap-
proved program); D. KAN. R. III, IV (omitting ABA-approved law school enrollment as a
prerequisite); E.D. LA. R. 21.13-21.14; M. D. LA. R. 1J(2)-1J(3) (requiring student advocate
oath); D. ME. R. 8(b) (limiting participation to University of Maine law students; requiring
student certification of familiarity with ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, federal
civil procedure, criminal procedure and evidence rules; and district local rules); N.D. Miss.
STUDENT PRACTICE R. §§ 2-3 (prescribing student advocate oath); E.D. Mo. R. 26 (incorpo-
rating by reference Mo. Sup. CT. R. 13.02.03, which admits students after they complete "50
of the credits required for graduation", student certification of familarity with the Missouri
CANONS OF ETHICS, and limiting trial participation as in N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 41); D. MoNT. R.
III, IV (requiring student certification of familiarity with ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
sPONsmILrry); D. NEB. R. 5(M)(3)-(4), 5(N)(3)-(4); D.N.H.R. 5(c) (permitting "second or
third year student" practice as well as admitting graduates of "any accredited law school in
the United States," without further requirements); E.D.N.Y.R. 4.1(3) (permitting student
practice after two semesters but requiring student certification of familiarity with ABA
CODE OF PROESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY and "the federal procedural... rules relevant to the
action in which he is appearing"); N.D.N.Y. SPECIAL R. No. 1, § 3 (requiring certification of
general familiarity with federal procedural and evidentiary rules without regard to type of
action in which advocate is appearing); N.D. OHIO R. 2(h) (admitting students of schools
either accredited by American Association of Law Schools or American Bar Association, and
requiring that students must have completed half credit hours required for graduation);
E.D. PA. R. 9 1/2, §§ I-rn (requiring two-semester course in civil rights law "or the
equivalent" for appearance in prisoner civil rights case, one of two kinds of cases in which
student may participate); D.S.C. ORDER (limiting participation to University of South Caro-
lina law students and requiring student certification of familiarity with ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS); D.S. DAK. R. 2 §8 8.2, 8.3, 8.8 (requiring student certification of fa-
miliarity with ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSBiLrrv, S.D. COMPILED LAWS, title 16,
and South Dakota's attorney-client privilege); W.D. TENN. R. 1(a) (requiring completion of
"courses in Civil Procedure, Evidence, and [being] knowledgeable of the code of professional
responsibility and [having] developed sufficient maturity and character that he will comply
with that code," and enrollment for credit in Memphis State University Law School's legal
clinic); E.D. VA. R. 7(N)(II)-7(N)(UI) (requiring student certification of familiarity with
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY); W.D. VA. THIRD YEAR PRACTICE RULE, II,
III (same).
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to ABA-approved schools.
Limitations on participation by the amount of legal education should
be stated in clear terms, as the Model Rule's "three semesters ... or the
equivalent" does; reference to "credits" or "hours" is imprecise and
should be avoided. Student eligibility is, of course, bottomed on the
court's confidence in the quality of the student's progressing legal educa-
tion, the law schools involved, the programs they sponsor, and ultimately
the supervisor. Within a given jurisdiction, a broad range of schools often
exists. In the same area, for example, there might be schools, attracting
students with 750-plus Law School Aptitude Test scores and solid under-
graduate averages of nearly 4.0, with dual approval of the ABA and the
AALS, and schools that take applicants with less robust credentials or are
not approved by the ABA or the AALS. Curriculums within law schools
are not standardized, and courses with the same names may have varying
content. This raises the question of what students should be admitted to
practice before the federal courts. The Model Rule takes the middle
ground, requiring familiarity with subject areas commonly invoked by the
district courts, third-semester status and no particular accreditation for
the law school but connection of the student advocacy program with a law
school. Traditionalists might advocate rising senior status, limitation to
schools accredited by the ABA, and a longer list of subject areas with
which the student must be (or say he is) familiar. Other courts, perhaps
reflecting local law school curriculums, might loosen requirements, to one
year of legal education, no accreditation, or no required subject. Since a
Model Rule is at stake, and not a proposed change under the Enabling
Act170 or analogous legislation, M  each federal court.is free to choose its
own standards. Nevertheless, in the interest of cross-country uniformity,
and to minimize the criticism that has been levelled (occasionally with
reason) at local rules,172 there should be some norms. In general, student
practice rules should be harmonious within a circuit, so that a student
could assist with preparation of the appeal if the final judgment in the
district court came early enough in the second year.273 The Model Rule's
restrictions are a good benchmark, but they may be inapposite in a given
170 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
171 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (1976) (multidistrict litigation); 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1976)
(criminal cases); 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976) (bankruptcy); 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (evidence). The
appellate rules were promulgated through a combination of the authority in §§ 2072, 2075-
76, and 3771-72 of title 28 of. the United States Code. See generally text accompanying
notes 19-62 supra.
172 Certainly no local student practice rule should be a trap, particularly for a student
advocate from another district. Cf. WRIGHT, supra note 5, § 63, at 294-95 (citing Woodham
v. American Cytoscope Co., 335 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1964)). The district court rule may
be challenged for abuse of discretion, see Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548-49
(2d Cir. 1961), or void as being inconsistent with Fan. R. Civ. P. 83's general authority to
regulate practice through reasonable local rules, see McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 402
(4th Cir. 1976).
17' Compare E.D. PA. R. 9 2 §§ I-i1 with 3D Cn. R. 9(2)(I)(a); D. CoNN. R. Civ. P. 26
with 2D CI. Supp. R. § 46(e)(3)(ii).
1980] 1133
1134 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction. With the elaborate certification supervision requirements, 174
the rules on amount of legal education and knowledge of subject areas
appear to be unnecessary and might involve the federal courts in time-
consuming evaluations of law school curricula that could be considered
more functionally in the annual review of the program and its supervi-
sors. Imposing additional course requirements,'7 5 subject areas,7 6 accredi-
tation standards for law schools, 77 or residence178 or specific law school
enrollment requirements,'79 will compound the problem. They are argua-
bly discriminatory in some cases, and should be stricken from present
local rules. If a quantum of legal education must be stated, it should be
fixed at one year 80 with careful review of the type of case or participation
allowed rising second year students in a particular school's certified pro-
gram.18 This will eliminate the definitional and choice of law problems
addressed above. The student compensation issue' 82 will be discussed in a
subsequent section of this article.
In summary, a student practice rule should articulate few, if any,
course, subject area, or educational level requirements. The elaborate cer-
tification process contemplated by the Model Rule - court certification
of the program, supervisor and student; dean and supervisor certification
of the student; student certification of preparedness; the law school's au-
thority to withdraw the program; and, client consent for student repre-
sentation - is enough control to assure quality.
D. Certification, Supervision and Consent Requirements
The Model Rule contains detailed certification, supervision and con-
sent requirements, reflecting in part the experience of the ABA Rule and
present local rules, but affirmatively positioning the court as the final and
primary control device for effective student advocacy. As the Subcommit-
tee's Conclusion put it, "The responsibility for the standards of student
law practice is that of the courts. The standards of practice before any
"' See text accompanying notes 183-244 infra.
175 See, e.g., E.D. PA. R. 9 2, § II (requiring two civil rights cases).
"16 See, e.g., D.S. DAK. R. 2, § 8.2(6) (requiring familiarity with all of S.D. CoM. LAws,
title 16, and complete structure of state court system).
177 See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 71.921 (limiting program to ABA-accredited schools or those
"certified by the State Board of Education of Georgia under GA. CODE § 32-415"); N.D.
OHIO R. 2(h)(admitting students of law schools accredited by either ABA or AALS).
178 See, e.g., D. DEL. R. 4(B) (incorporating by reference DEL. S. CT. R. 55 and DEL. BD.
BAR. EXAMINERS, R. 55.2(a) which grants Delaware residency to recent law graduates).
1' D. HAwAI R. 1(a) (University of Hawaii School of Law); D. ME. R. 8(b) (University
of Maine School of Law); D.S.C. ORDER (University of South Carolina Law School); W.D.
TENN. R. 1(a) 1 (Memphis State law students enrolled in its legal clinic).
180 See D. CONN. R. Civ. P. 26(3).
181 See White, The Anatomy of a Clinical Law Course, in KrrcH, supra note 15, at 158,
167.
'a, MODEL RULE, § (7), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; see text accompanying
notes 245-260 infra.
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court will be as good as the judges insist that it be, and student law prac-
tice is no exception." The Final Report also noted "[o]ne overriding fac-
tor emerging: The quality and degree of supervision of student practition-
ers is a primary determinant of the quality of student practice. The talent
of the supervisors is the key. Standards for supervisors are viewed as far
more important than rigid rules regarding student eligibility." ' With re-
spect to certification of the clinical program and the supervisor, the
Model Rule represents a major departure from the ABA Rule and most
local federal rules."8 Emphasis on the court's certification of the student
has been increased. Most judges that responded to a recent survey indi-
cated that they felt they could and should thus assist in the educational
process without compromising their neutrality in fact and in
appearance.
185
Certification of the law student under the Model Rule was alluded to
in the previous section of this article. The law school dean must certify
the student's good character, legal ability and training through three
semesters of law school including knowledge of the federal civil, criminal
and evidence rules and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, as
sufficient to fulfill the student's responsibilities to the client and the
court.""8 This certification apparently must be approved by the court.187
103 Id. at 3.; accord, Leleiko, supra note 5, at 930. "[T]he governing principle, even for
the educator's needs, should be a high quality of service." Ferren, Goals, Models and Pros-
pects for Clinical-Legal Education, in KrrcH, supra note 15, at 94, 111. I have omitted Mr.
Ferren's qualifying, but cryptic, "(minimum)", because this might be construed out of con-
text to mean "pass-level" or "get-by" quality work, which is not the thrust of his essay.
184 Those judges - about 50 percent in one survey - who do not discuss the program,
student performance, or supervisor performance with the supervisor will have those respon-
sibilities under the MODEL RULE. See Rubin, The View from the Bench, in CLINICAL EDUCA-
TION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 251, 252-53. However, as Judge Rubin notes,
the supervisors did not take advantage of the opportunity to evaluate their programs. Id. at
255. Under the MODEL RULE, as proposed, there will be no choice for participating courts,
law schools or supervisors.
'85 In the survey, most judges said "the judicial process should be completed and deci-
sion rendered before the judge engages in pedagogy." Id. at 256. See also Levittan, The
Clinical Program for Law Students - The View from the Bench, in Id., at 279, 290; Wenke,
My View from the Bench, in id. at 292, 295-97; Klein, The Courtroom as Classroom: The
View from the Bench, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 91, 96. Klein
acknowledges the possibility of trying cases in a law school but notes that such a course of
action may not be in the interests of justice in light of the problem of inconveniencing activ-
ities and jurors. Id. at 98. The author has observed three-judge district courts, which usually
are concerned with legal issues, meeting in the Wake Forest Law School. Repeal of, or
amendments to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-82, 2284 (1976) have dried up this source of cases, but a
day of motions arguments in any court could be set for a law school courtroom with little
practical difficulty, as could panels of courts of appeals. Authority for authorizing such spe-
cial sittings of federal courts includes 28 U.S.C. §§ 141, 142 (1976) (district courts); 28
U.S.C. § 256 (1976) (Customs Court); 28 U.S.C. § 48 (1976) (courts of appeals); 28 U.S.C. §
214 (Court of Claims and Patent Appeals). The Supreme Court and Court of Claims must
sit at the seat of the national government. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2, 174 (1976).
186 See MODEL RULE § B(1), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
187 MODEL RULE § E(1)(a), in id. at 14, speaks of "[c]ertification by the ... dean and
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Initiation of the dean's certificate would probably come from the supervi-
sor, since he must have faculty or adjunct faculty status, 88 and such ad-
ministrative policy decisions are usually channelled through the dean.
The law dean's certification must be filed with the clerk of court and ex-
pires after eighteen months unless sooner withdrawn. 8 9 The court must
also certify the student, 90 and this "[c]ertification to appear in a particu-
lar case may be withdrawn by the Court at any time, in the discretion of
the Court, and without any showing of cause."' 91
The major change with the new rule is court approval of the entire
program in which the clinical advocate operates. As summarized by sec-
tion C of the Model Rule, the program
1. must be a law school clinical practice program for credit, in
which a law student obtains academic and practice advocacy
training, utilizing law school faculty or adjunct faculty for prac-
tice supervision, including federal government attorneys or pri-
vate practitioners;
2. must be certified by the court;
3. must be conducted in such a manner as not to conflict with
normal court schedules;
4. may accept compensation other than from a client, such as
Criminal Justice Act (CJA) payments;
5. must maintain malpractice insurance for its activities.
192
The Comments to the Model Rule strongly encourage a clinical semester
or half semester, rather than a part-time or single-course schedule in
which conventional classes or seminars are mixed with clinical work.
"Student practice programs must accept the obligation to ensure that
student practice accommodates itself to normal court scheduling and to
minimizing the student's difficulty in performing in his academic
courses."' 5 The Comments note that orientation or ongoing components
might include traditional subjects such as evidence, advanced courses in
civil or criminal procedure, or jurisdiction, or case-related courses 94 such
approval by the courts," and has been interpreted here to mean that the dean's certification
shall be approved by the court.
18 MODEL RULE § C(1), in id. at 7, 10. Qualified clinical supervisors have advocated
faculty status as a minimum requirement, "with care taken that they are included in faculty
deliberations in ways to assure that they feel very much a part of the teaching program of
the law school." Ferren, Goals, Models and Prospects for Clinical-Legal Education, in
KrrCH, supra note 15, at 94, 119. See text accompanying notes 206-226 (discussing faculty
status issues).
:89 MODEL RULE § E(1)(a), in INAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
,o MODEL RULE § B(6), in id. at 5.
11 MODEL RULE § E(1)(b), in id. at 14.
19 MODEL RULE § C, in id. at 7.
1" Id. at 718 (comments to MODEL RULE § C).
19 Id. at 9. Supervisors have reported considerable problems with classes missed on
account of clinical projects. See, e.g., White, The Anatomy of a Clinical Law Course, in
KrrcH, supra note 15, at 158, 168.
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as negotiations, office practice, professional responsibility, or specialty ar-
eas like civil rights.195 Law schools on a quarter system have more flex-
ibility during the academic year if less than half a year will be allowed for
clinical practice. Semester system schools might consider a trimester, ex-
tending over the summer, to cut the clinical experience to four months
while preserving most of the traditional class/seminar work and insuring
continuity of caseload through the year. Semester schools might also con-
sider the staggered curriculum,1 used in many medical schools,"9" for in-
troductory, preparatory or short courses in the later clinical years.
This kind of program could require major curriculum and scheduling
changes for traditional schools,"" if a third-semester entry level for stu-
dents is available. Some courses that are often taught in the fourth se-
mester, such as evidence, will have to be moved forward, and typically
senior-level classes such as state practice, professional responsibility, of-
fice practice, or moot trial or advanced appellate court, must be radically
relocated or combined, particularly if a law school approves a half-year
arrangement. There will be an initial doubling-up phenomenon,199 such as
occurs when a multiple-section course teacher becomes unavailable due to
illness or death. Additionally there may be long-range scheduling, teach-
ing load,20 0 salary, and hiring problems, since many clinical teachers may
not desire a twelve-month teaching load with extra compensation for the
summer. Law faculty members are not instantly fungible; "[t]he tenured
fifty-year-old future interests teacher is not readily convertible at the will
of the Dean into a clinician."2' Even if all parties are totally willing,
there is a triple net loss in shifting faculty around: loss of the seasoned
teacher's expertise in the course he gives up; the time lost while his re-
placement "comes up to the speed" of his predecessor, unless the replace-
ment is equally experienced; and the preparation and seasoning time re-
195 See 3D CIR. R. 9(I)(a); E.D. PA. R. 9 1/2, §§ 1, 11. The CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9,
at 3-4, 15-18, 23-25, recommends that law schools broaden their curriculums to include such
courses as legal writing, oral communications, fact-gathering, interviewing, counseling, nego-
tiation in the context of small classes, intensive instruction and instructional use of exper-
ienced, able judges and lawyers. The Dzvrrr REPor, supra note 1, at 228-29, would require
such courses.
1" See, e.g., Curriculum Report Prepared by School of Law, University of South Caro-
lina, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 528 (1971).
197 See Creger & Glaser, Clinical Teaching in Medicine: Its Relevance for Legal Edu-
cation, in KrrcH, supra note 15, at 77, 81-82.
198 See Pincus, CLEPR Looks Ahead, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note
2, at 3, 15.
1,8 With regard to doubling-up, Dean Harvey's comment, that law "faculty are not fun-
gible," is appropriate. See Panel Discussion, Financing Student Clinical Programs, in
KrrcH, supra note 15, at 34, 50.
10 The normal semester teaching load for a full-time faculty member is an average of
eight scheduled class hours per week, if repetitions are counted as one-half, or 10 hours if
repetitions are counted at full value. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 404(a). Many schools
assign a six-hour teaching load.
201 Putz, Including Clinical Education in the Law School Budget, in CLEPR CONFER-
E9NCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 101, 104.
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quired by the veteran teacher who moves into the clinical or other areas.
Finally, there is "[t]he principle of teacher autonomy [which is] widely
adhered to in legal education."20 2
Judges conferring with the law schools must understand the complex-
ity of these administrative and philosophical problems, which may be
particularly acute for smaller schools with less than robust budgets and
smaller faculties, or schools that are located where the pool of qualified
prospects for adjunct faculty is small. Law schools and courts should con-
sider a phased clinical program that accounts for these factors but which
moves toward a stated desired goal.
Supervision requirements under the new rule are extensive. A supervi-
sor must have faculty or adjunct faculty status and be certified by the
dean as being of good character, sufficient legal ability, and adequately
trained to fulfill supervisory responsibilities. He must be admitted to
practice in the court where the student is certified, and must be certified
by the court as well.2 0 3 The court's certification of the supervisor is indefi-
nite but may be withdrawn by the court at the end of the academic year
without cause, "or at any time upon notice and a showing of cause." The
dean's certification, presumably filed with the court, may be withdrawn
by him upon notice to the clerk and presumably without cause.2 °0 Pro-
grams also continue indefinitely unless certification is withdrawn. "Certi-
fication of a program may be withdrawn by the Court at the end of any
academic year without cause, or at any time, provided notice stating the
cause for such withdrawal is furnished to the law school dean and super-
visor". 20 5 Presumably "such withdrawal" refers to decertification of a pro-
gram at other than the end of the academic year, although another read-
ing of this subsection could mean that notice stating the reason must be
sent to the dean and the supervisor for any withdrawal, not just those
coming at the end of the academic year. One ambiguity in the supervisor
and program termination rules is the phrase, "end of any academic year."
Some schools might interpret this as a time other than the end of classes
in May or June, perhaps at the end of summer school or the institution's
fiscal year. There is no specified requirement for prompt notification, and
this might work a real hardship on a cooperating law school and its pro-
grams if termination came in midsummer after personnel had been hired,
the curriculum had been planned, and the summer vacation had started.
202 CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 26. The Report urges that teacher autonomy, a
cherished aspect of legal education, must give way to a more structured curriculum, "even
though this may require surrendering some individual classroom autonomy". Id. at 4, 27.
203 MODEL RuLE §§ D(1)-D(3), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11.
204 MODEL RULE § E(3), in id. at 14-15. The Rule is silent on whether the dean's certifi-
cation of the supervision is formally filed, but presumably it is filed with the clerk as other
certifications are. Although MODEL RULE § E(3)(b) distinguishes between supervisor termi-
nation with or without court articulated reasons, there is no such differentiation for termi-
nation by a dean. Presumably such termination could come at any time without notice for
any reason.
205 MODEL RULE § E(2), in id. at 14.
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Notice of termination at the end of the academic year for supervisor or
program could create difficulties unless the notice is given as early as
practicable, and preferably before November 1, since the faculty hiring
season generally runs from then or earlier until the end of February, and
the beginning of the annual academic budget process may start shortly
thereafter.
Several alternatives are possible to the interpretation problems
presented. The "such withdrawal" clause might be redrafted to clarify
what is probably meant - notice of cause only for withdrawal at the end
of the academic year. The "end of any academic year" might be stated in
the local rule in terms of a certain date derived after consultation with
affected law schools, or the phrase could be defined in individual pro-
grams or the certification document. For the protection of the law school,
a stated notice time or date should be included in the program or certifi-
cation document, thus tailoring notice to each school's needs. As noted
with respect to student certification, the whole process may be delegated
to the local court's rules committee or a subcommittee, 2" but this group
should also be familiar with the scheduling problems stated above.
Another latent problem is faculty status for clinical supervisors. While
some law schools have awarded faculty, tenure-track status to clinicians,
and some tenure-track professors have undertaken selected clinical cases,
many clinical teachers do not have either potential tenure or faculty sta-
tus. Some law school administrators may be concerned "that attorneys
engaged in clinical supervision may, once tenured, decide to give up the
enervating rigors of clinical teaching and turn to traditional teaching for
which they may not be as well qualified. '207 A partial response is that
such clinicians may be overworked, either in terms of docket loads or stu-
dents, and the solution is a rational workload comparable with the ABA
and AALS standards for classroom instruction.208 A more fundamental
problem is that there has been less than complete understanding and
compatibility between the clinicians and the traditional teachers,209 some-
times bordering on open academic warfare in some law schools. There has
been precedent for this within the ranks of purely academic lawyers
210
and in the medical schools.211 The Crarmton Report, however, explicitly
20 Id. at 17 (Comments to MODEL RULE § E).
207 Subin, Directing and Managing Legal Education in a Service Setting, in CLEPR
CONFERENcE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 57, 60, 66. For a discussion of tenure and clinical
instructions, see Panel Discussion, Motivating the Law School Faculty in the Twenty-First
Century: Is There Life in Tenure?, 30 J. LEGAL EDuc. 1 (1979).
20' See text accompanying notes 160 & 200 supra.
20, See Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School? 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907, 908-17
(1933), cited in Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why Has It
Failed? in KrrcH, supra note 15, at 54, 72 n.61.
2" See Comment, Ernest Freund - Pioneer of Administrative Law, 29 U. CH. L. REv.
755, 763-70 (1962), noted in Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why
has it Failed? in KrrcH, supra note 15, at 72, n. 60.
"z Creger & Glaser, Clinical Teaching in Medicine: Its Relevance for Legal Education,
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states that "[e]xperimentation with and creation of new teaching methods
and materials that focus on the improvement of fundamental lawyer skills
should be valued no less highly than research on legal doctrine. '21 2 Sim-
ply put, if clinical teaching must become a part of the curriculum, as the
Devitt and Cramton Reports would indicate, then both academic and
clinical teachers must accept this change, even as their predecessors
reached an understanding on the acceptance of the case or problem
method as alternative ways of teaching, or the inclusion of such far-out
subjects as taxation in the curriculum.
Present accreditation regulations state that the principal burden of
the law school's educational program rests on its full-time faculty mem-
bers.218 Law school administrators and clinical directors have been alerted
to the problem of hiring adjunct lawyers who are really too busy to as-
sume the responsibility of proper clinical supervision; 214 indeed, the
Rule's Comments admonish limiting practicing lawyers to three stu-
dents. 15 Too often the best and brightest lawyers are the busiest and are
often too involved for proper participation as an adjunct. There has been
commentary on the Model Rule's failure to allow student practice under
lawyer supervision where the activity has not been authorized by a law
school.2
16
Perhaps the best general solution for the faculty status issue is hiring
core clinical personnel - the director and his assistants, who should be
qualified to teach standard courses - with faculty status. Adjuncts
should be appointed as necessary for individual supervision, whether the
program centers with private law offices, defenders, prosecutors, corpora-
tions or a combination. There is nothing in the Model Rule to prohibit
such an approach.2" Law schools such as Antioch or Northeastern, which
in KrrcH, supra note 15, at 77, 90.
212 CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 4; see also id. at 26-27.
215 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 8, § 403; AALS, BYLAWS, art. 6(4)(b) in AssocIATION
INFORMATION, supra note 8, at 7.
214 Wilson, Clinical Programs at Boston University School of Law, in KITCH, supra
note 15, at 176, 185.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (Comments to MODEL RULE § D).
216 See, e.g., MODEL RuLE § C(1), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. Section C(1)
explicitly limits student practice to law school programs. Therefore, a student could not
participate in a case under a lawyer's supervision unless the requirement were waived or
rules of participation were observed by the law school. See also text accompanying note 252
infra.
27 The Comments to MODEL RuLE § D state:
Use of private counsel as supervising attorneys is encouraged. Private counsel may
make it possible for students to work with lawyers who have extensive litigation
experience. Private counsel would supervise students in association with faculty
members of a student practice program. It is important that the academic aspects
of a student practice program be emphasized and private counsel supervision
should he fully integrated into the other aspects of the student practice program.
Also, less-experienced faculty will benefit from the opportunity to work with more
experienced litigators.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
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place heavy emphasis on the clinical component," '1 may continue their
programs unimpeded. Furthermore, the more traditional schools will be
able to proceed as before, with the adjustment of adding a faculty-staffed
and faculty-approved program and use of adjuncts for individual cases
and students. Awarding tenure is a separate issue, to be decided by
schools on an individual basis. What the Model Rule quite properly seeks
to avoid is the trap of the clerkship concept of the thirties, which degen-
erated into a supply of cheap labor for the bar with little educational
input.21' In doing so, the Rule adheres to its primary purpose of better
legal education for future practitioners.220 As stated earlier, the primary
function of a lawyer participating in a student practice program is his
partnership in building and maintaining the national asset that is legal
education; he should not be a mere guide to show students where the
courthouse is, nor should he be only an employer of cheap professional
assistants.221 Of course, although not technically certification of the stu-
dent, or approval of the quality of the clinical'program or the supervising
lawyer, the client also must approve student involvement.
2 2
An issue not addressed by the Model Rule is the problem of the judge
who wants no part of a program that his brethren desire to implement by
local rule and appropriate certification, perhaps because of docket loads
or other entirely understandable reasons. Resolution of this problem must
be left to the individual courts. Certain district courts and the circuit
courts have local rules only applicable to particular divisions or classes of
cases, 22 and experience under these procedures might point to adoption
of a rule that in effect applies to clinical cases filed before certain mem-
bers of the particular bench. Chief judges might use their case assignment
power 24 to keep clinical cases away from an objecting judge. Although
the opinion has been expressed that the dissenting judge should not be
218 See Leleiko, supra note 5, at 937. The Harvard Law School recently allocated $2.5
million for increased training in trial advocacy under a joint program with Northeastern in
Boston. See DEvrrr REPORT, supra note 1, at 221 n. 13. As previously noted, the Chief Jus-
tice has praised this program. See note 139 supra.
"I See generally, Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why Has
It Failed?, in KITCH, supra note 15, at 54-76; Stevens, Legal Education: Historicial Perspec-
tives, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 43.
"zo MODEL RULE § A, in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
21 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
12. MoDEL RULE §§ F(1), F(3), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-18. On client con-
sent generally, see Vetri, On Teaching Professional Responsibility Through Clinical Legal
Education Programs, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 70, 87-88; see
also id. at 88-89 (discussing problems of student consent).
U2 District court local rules routinely provide for special treatment of habeas corpus
and social security cases, to supplement general norms. See, e.g., SECTION 2254 R., supra
note 27; SECTION 2255 R., supra note 27; see also FED. R. App. P. 22-24 (establishing special
procedures for postconviction appeals).
224 28 U.S.C. §§ 137, 175, 253, 292 (1976). Judges of the court of appeals, "sit on the
court and its divisions in such order and at such times as the court directs," and the division
hears "cases and controversies assigned as the court directs." 28 U.S.C. §§ 46(a) & (b)
(1976).
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compelled to participate in the program,12 5 this decision is for the courts.
The ABA Rule's certification centers around attorney/dean certifica-
tion but stops short of affirmative court approval. The client must con-
sent,22 as in the Model Rule. The supervisor must "[b]e a lawyer whose
service as a supervisory lawyer for [the] program is certified by the dean
of the law school in which the law student is enrolled," a provision similar
to that of the Model Rule, except that the latter requires faculty status
and the dean's certification of competence in law and for the program.
Under the ABA Rule, the dean must certify the student "as being of good
character and competent ability," and being adequately trained to per-
form as a legal intern. Additionally, the supervisor must introduce him to
the court, thereby implying227 independent supervisor certification as
well. The Model Rule requires a similar dean certification. 28 Such cer-
tifiction is also implicit in the review process for documents to be filed in
court as well as the lawyer's permitting the student to participate in open
court.22 19 The ABA Rule also provides for filing of the dean's student cer-
tification, which will remain in effect for eighteen months or until the bar
examination results are announced, whichever is earlier. The Model Rule,
which is keyed to the law school program, would drop the student's certi-
fication upon graduation. The Model Rule, unlike the ABA Rule, does not
explicitly require notice to the court before withdrawal of certification
but prudence or a provision of the general program to be certified by the
court should make the notice requirement clear. The ABA Rule presaged
the Model Rule's position of permitting the court to decertify the student
at any time without notice.2 0 As noted above, the Commentary would
permit coverage of the hiatus between graduation and admission to prac-
tice by individual court's arrangements. 2 1
In general, the circuit rules follow the ABA standards,23 2 as do the
226 See Klein, The Courtroom as Classroom: The View From the Bench, in CLEPR
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 91, 96.
" ABA RULE § II(A), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 993; KITCH, supra note 15, at 228.
22. Compare ABA RULE § VI(A), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 995; KITCH, supra note 15,
at 230-31 with MODEL RULE § D(1), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11. The MODEL
RULE does not formally require that the student be introduced to the court but etiquette if
not common sense would suggest this procedure.
2 MODEL RULE § E(3), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14-15.
29 ABA RULE §§ II, V, in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 993-95; KITCH, supra note 15, at
228-30; MODEL RULE, §§ D(4)-D(5), D(7)-D(9), F(1), F(3), in FINAL REPORT supra note 1, at
11, 17-18.
M The ABA RULE allows certification to continue in effect until the student is admit-
ted to the bar in those jurisdictions that require no bar examination. Compare ABA RULE §
IV, in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 994; KITCH, supra note 15, at 229-30 with MODEL RULE §
E(1), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. The AMENDED ABA RULE has the same provi-
sions as its predecessor.
231 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 (comments to MODEL RULE § F).
2 The Second Circuit provides for decertification by a majority of a panel hearing a
case, with recertification by a dean or a faculty member for a student's appearances before
other panels. 2D CIa. Surp. R. § 46 (e)(3)(iii). The First, Third and Fourth Circuits have no
time limit, and therefore certification lapses upon graduation. D.C. CIR. R. 20 (HI); 1sT CIR.
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district courts.2 3 A significant number of the district rules, however, omit
certification entirely23 ' or anticipate the Model Rule by variously provid-
ing for program certification or supervisor certification 2 3 5 in addition to
the nearly standard terms of dean certification and withdrawal of certifi-
cation by the court or the dean. For courts generally following the ABA
Rule, the major shift in emphasis, if the Model Rule is adopted, will be
the sections concerning approval of the supervisor and the school pro-
gram. If the goal of a district court's student practice is restated as quali-
ty legal education to produce better qualified trial or appellate practition-
ers, then court certification of a clinical program and its supervisors is a
necessary and inevitable step.
The ABA Rule and existing local rules universally require approval of
the client or the United States Attorney in the case of student-assisted
prosecutors or their appeals. Where student advocacy in civil cases in
which the United States is a party is sought, consent of the United States
Attorney is also necessary.
238
Supervisor certification or qualification in ABA Rule-based formulas
approximates the prescriptions of the Model Rule. The ABA Rule re-
R. (I)(i); 3D Cm. R. 9(2)(III); 4TH Cm. Supp. R. 13(c).
233 See, e.g., D. DsL. &. 4(B) (incorporating by reference DEL. BD. BAR EXAMINERS R.
55.2(a)(ii), 55.3(e), and requiring Preceptor approval plus Board of Bar Examiners Certifica-
tion); D.D.C.R. 2-9(c); N. D. GA. R. 71.923-.924, .93, .951 (requiring dean to approve supervi-
sor, such certification presumably being communicated to court in dean's certification of
student); D. HAwAnI R. §§ 1(c), 3, 4(a) (requiring Hawaii Law School approval of supervisor);
D. KAN. R. §§ III(c), IV, VI(A) (departing from ABA RULE in requiring court rather than
dean approval of supervising lawyer); E.D. LA. R. 21.13(c); M.D. LA. R. 1J(2)(c), 1J(3); D.
ME. R. 8(b); N.D. Miss. STUDENT PRAcTIcE R. §§ 2(c), 3; E.D. Mo. R. 26 (incorporating by
reference Mo. S. CT. R. 13.02(c), .03 and omitting requirement of dean's approval of super-
visor); D. MONT. ORDER §§ III(C), IC (omitting requirement of dean's approval of supervi-
sor) D. NEB. R. 5(M)(3)-(4), 5(N)(3)-(4) (requiring dean's approval only for defense counsel);
E.D.N.Y.R. 4.1(3)(c) (allowing faculty member to certify student); N.D.N.Y. SPECIAL R. No.
1, § 3(c) (permitting practice upon "recommendation" by dean or faculty member); E.D. PA.
R. 9 , §§ 11 (B), III; D.S.C. ORDER (c); D.S. DAK. R. 2, § 8.2(3), 8.3-5, 8.8 (adding provi-
sions for certifications by supervising lawyer including blanket certification by United States
Attorney) W.D. TENN. R. 1(a)(1); E.D. VA. R. 7(N)(II)(C), (III), (V)(A) (requiring court cer-
tification of supervisor). W.D. VA. THIRD YEAR PR^cncE R. §§ II(C), III, V(A)(same). State
supervision requirements in general track the ABA formula but there are local variants per-
mitting nonfaculty supervision. See Leleiko, supra note 5, at 922-23.
234 D. CONN. R. Civ. P. 26; N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 41; S.D. IowA R. § 1 (stating only that
dean's certification of student is required; rules do not contain decertification procedure).
231 D. IDAHO R. 2(g)(2), 2(g)(6) (incoiporating reference IDAHO S. CT. R. 123 (B)(1)(b),
123 (B)(2), 123 (D)(3)-123(D)(5), 123(D)(7), 123 (E)) (limitations on who may be supervisor
and indirect control over legal aid programs by required approval of Idaho Supreme Court
and Idaho State Bar for supervision of more than one student in such projects); D.N.H.R.
5(c) (omitting specific reference to dean's certification but permitting student defense prac-
tice as part of any legal aid society, legal services programs, or public defender program by
New Hampshire Supreme Court or district court); N.D. OHIO R. 2(h)(4) (omitting reference
to law school certification but allowing student practice if approved by court and in connec-
tion with legal services program or law school clinical program).
M' For complete citations of present clinical rules, see notes 5 & 6 supra. These rules
should be compared with ABA RUL. § 6 II(A)-II(B).
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quires the supervisor to be a lawyer approved for the program by the law
school dean. In contrast, many local rules require approval by the court
and not the dean. The supervisor must "assume personal professional re-
sponsibility for the student's guidance in any work undertaken and for
supervising the quality of the student's work[,]" and he must "[a]ssist the
student in his preparation to the extent [he] considers it necessary." As
noted above, there are also requirements that he cosign all documents
and be present with the student throughout the case.28 7 Very few local
rules specifically limit the number of students for supervisors, and none
adopt the sliding-scale philosophy of the Model Rule, although many
rules seem to contemplate case-by-case student representation, particu-
larly at the appellate level.2 ' 8 Although the local rules, like the ABA
Rule,239 often require that the supervising attorney be a member of the
court's bar,24 0 this does not seem necessary since two thirds of the federal
courts require local admittees in every case, even when visiting lawyers
argue pro hac vice.2 4 1 Perhaps the Model Rule drafters meant to elimi-
237 ABA RULE §§ V, VI, in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 995; KITCH, supra note 15, at 230-
31; see also notes 5 & 6 supra (citing local rules). Sections V and VI of the AMENDED ABA
RULE are identical with the 1969 ABA RULE provisions.
238 E.g., D.C. CiR. R. 20 I(c), 1ST CIR. R. I(3)(a); 2D CIR. Supp. R. § 46 (e)(3)(iii); 3D CIR.
Supp. R. 9(2)(I)(b); 4TH CIR. Supp. R. 13. These rules refer to the appearance or approval of
student counsel on a case-by-case basis. This reflects ABA RULE § II(c). See Leleiko, supra
note 5, at 994; KrrcH, supra note 15, at 229; but see D. IDAHO R. 2(g) (incorporating by
reference IDAHO Sup. CT. R. 123 (D)(5)); D. MONT. ORDER § V (D) (allowing only one stu-
dent per lawyer in all cases except those involving indigents and law school clinical pro-
gram). Most local rules follow the pattern of the circuit and ABA rules in contemplating one
lawyer and one student per case. Cf. W. D. TENN. R. l(a)(1) (regulating number of students
by cases in which assistance is needed by court).
2' ABA RULE § VI(A), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 995; KITCH, supra note 15, at 230-31.
240 D.C. CIR. R. 20 (IV)(1); 1ST CIR. R. I(1); 2D CIR. Supp. R. § 46(e)(2); 3D CIR. R.
9(2)(IV) (a)(i); 4TH CIR. Supp. R. 13(4)(d); D. CONN. R. Civ. P. 26 (2)(a); D.D.C.R. 2-9 (d)(1);
N.D. GA. R. 71.954; D. HAWAII R. § 1(c); D. IDAHO R. 2(g)(1); N.D. ILL. R. 41; S.D. IOWA R. §
2; D. KAN. R. III (D); E.D. LA. R. 21.15(a); M.D. LA. R. 1 J(4)(a); D. ME. R. 8(c); N.D. MIss.
STUDENT PRACTIcE R. § 4(a); E.D. Mo. R. 26; D. MONT. R. § V(A); D. NEB. R. M(1)-M(3),
N(5); D.N.H.R. 5(c); E.D.N.Y.R. 4.1(2)(a); N.D.N.Y. SPEcIAL R. No. 1, § 2(a); N.D. OHIO R.
2.10; E.D. PA. R. 9 /2, II(D), IV; D.S.C. ORDER § d; D.S. DAK. R. 2, § 8.9; E.D. VA. R.
7(N)(V)(c); W.D. VA. THIRD YEAR PRACTIcE R. § V(A).
241 Exeptions to the local counsel rules include the circuits, which under FED. R. App. P.
46(a) may admit lawyers admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the highest court of any state, another United States court of appeals, or a United States
distrcict court. Additional exceptions are provided by the following local rules: N.D. ALA. R.
7; E. & W.D. ARK. R. 1(d) (following FED. R. App. P. 46(a) pattern); C.D. CALIF. R. 1.3(b)
(giving district court discretion to require local counsel); D.D.C.R. 1-4(a)(4); M.D. FLA. R.
2.02(b) (excepting attorneys for United States); N.D. FLA. R. 5.(d) (local counsel did not
required if reciprocity shown); S.D. FLA. R. 16(d) (allowing discretionary waiver of local
counsel requirement for lawyers representing United States who are not required to associ-
ate local counsel); N.D. GA. R. 71.4 (waiving local counsel unless opposition or clerk so
moves, and waiving requirement for United States counsel); S.D. GA. R. 19.4 (similar to
preceeding); D. HAWAII R. 1(d); S.D. ILL. R. 19.4 (similar to preceeding); N. & S.D. IOWA R.
5(f) (excluding government agencies from local counsel requirement); E.D. LA. R. 21.6 (al-
lowing court waiver of local counsel requirement); D. ME. R. 3(d)(2) (no local counsel re-
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nate pro hac vice supervision by the subsequent adoption of a student
practice rule inconsistent with earlier local rules approving pro hac vice
appearance, but this interpretation problem should not be invited by a
district court with a local rule for counsel. That rule should be amended
or reconsidered, and the counsel requirement of the Model Rule dropped
as redundant. It might be argued that a locally-admitted attorney re-
quirement is unwise, given the need to attract clinical teachers who might
have to wait to pass the state bar examination to be admitted to state
court before admission in federal court.'2 or that such a requirement is
unnecessary because the cases are all "simple" and therefore expertise
may be gained quickly; or because the law is all federal and therefore
"universal" with easy translation from district to district or among the
circuits. These contentions are refuted by the fact that introduction of a
second great variable, in addition to the student's relative inexperience,
might provoke a disaster. Although the cases might be "simple" to the
newly-arrived clinical supervisor, he will be not only learning local nu-
ances but will also be adjusting to a new law school, a new program, and
perhaps the realization that law students are not completely fungible. Fi-
nally, federal cases do not always feature nationwide legal principles, not
even in federal law matters243 and almost never in diversity cases.244 On
balance, therefore, the local admission requirement is proper, but it
should be deleted where other local rules cover the situation.
E. Funding and Student Workload or Credits
Along with the Model Rule's shift in emphasis to legal education, the
Subcommittee's proposal repeats current policy in compensation and
quired for United States); D. MASS. R. 6 (waiving local counsel rule for United States and
upon motion of member of court for all other cases); W.D. MICH. R. 4 (waiving local counsel
requirement upon motion of member of bar); N.D. Miss. R. G-1 (admission if admitted to
another district court and "sponsored" by member of local bar); D. MINN. R. I(D)(E)
(waiver of local counsel requirement for attorneys for United States); D. NEv. R. 4(e) & (f);
D.N.H.R. 5(a) (no local counsel required for United States); W.D.N.C.R. 1(B) (association of
local counsel encouraged); M.D. PA. R. 201.02(a)-201.02(c) (exempting attorneys for United
States and legal services programs from local counsel requirement and allowing other law-
yers to proceed pro hac vice without local counsel in court's discretion); D.P.R.R. 4(d) (local
counsel exempted for attorneys for United States); D.S.D.R. 2 § 6 (local counsel exempted
for federal government); M.D. TENN. R. 1(d) (permitting district judge to dispense with
local counsel requirement); W.D. TENN. R. 1(b) (same); E.D. Wis. R. 2, § 2.04 (same); D.
Wyo. R. 3(b) (same). Three districts, the Middle District of Georgia, the Eastern District of
Kentucky, and the Eastern District of Texas, have no local rules. Thus, only eight of the 27
federal district courts with student practice rules have some kind of local counsel waiver
requirement. See also text accompanying note 63 supra.
242 See, e.g., FED. R. App. P. 46(a) (initial admission in courts of appeals); E.D. VA. R.
7(B) (initial admission in district courts).
243 See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011-13 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(discussing diversity of standards among circuits for competency of counsel).
44 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, ll (1945); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78- (1938).
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funding for clinical programs. The Model Rule states that the student
advocate "may not accept personal compensation for his legal services
from a client or other source.' 's45 The program, on the other hand, "may
accept compensation other than from a client, such as Criminal Justice
Act payments." It must maintain malpractice insurance for its activi-
ties.""8 There are no stated policies or limitations on compensation for
supervisors. Comments to the Rule state that "student credit for student
practice should reflect the reality of the hours a student must commit
. ..- a minimum of 20 ...a week." This contemplated workload is
stated in the context of the Model Rule's advocacy of a semester or half-
semester totally devoted to the clinical experience.247 Experience has
demonstrated that "[a] block of full time for the clinic, coupled with a
classroom component, may by far produce the most educational re-
sults.' '24s Use of the academic model, by which credit is awarded, instead
of a compensated system, also results in easier scheduling. If the student
has no or few classes to attend, then his time may be built around the
cases and other demands of the program with little or no conflicts with
classes. 249 If, on the other hand, it is useful to have students mingle with
their non-clinical peers to "shar[e] their observations, perceptions and
approaches from the perspective of their clinical experience[,]" 2 50 then
the academic and clinical divisions of the law school must accept the in-
evitable friction. With either type of program, the student's clinical expe-
rience inures to the benefit of his studies, emphasizing the importance of
solid legal knowledge gained through classroom study.
251
The rule against compensation by the client would seem to be incon-
sistent with potentially employing private counsel as adjunct faculty and
2'5 MODEL RULE § B(7), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
24" MODEL RULE § C(5), in id. at 7. Although no federal rule presently requires profes-
sional liability insurance, the MODEL RuE requirement has precedent in state practice
rules. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) offers malpractice insur-
ance, and NLADA membership is available to law school clinical programs. See Leleiko,
supra note 5, at 919. Private insurers or bar-sponsored programs may also be available in a
particular state.
24"7 MODEL RULE § C(4), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-8. See also text accompa-
nying notes 159-162 supra. Professor Ferren advocates "a given time commitment to field
work (say 10 hours per week)" as an ideal. Ferren, Goals, Models and Prospects of Clinical-
Legal Education, in KITCH, supra note 15, at 94, 109.
240 Ferren, Goals, Models and Prospects of Clinical-Legal Education, in KITCH, supra
note 15, at 120.
249 Bartels, Clinical Legal Education and the Delivery of Legal Services: The View
from the Prosecutor's Office, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at
190, 195.
"'0 See Wolf, The Delivery of Legal Services: Some Ethical Considerations in the Use
of Law Students, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 236, 244.
252 Levittan, The Clinical Program for Law Students-A View From the Bench, in
CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 279, 286. Judge Levittan does
concede that "there may, in some cases, be a dilution in [the student's] concentration on his
conventional courses," id. at 286, no doubt referring to clinical programs coupled with stan-
dard courses.
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the inclusion of matters other than indigents' cases in the program.2 52
The Comments reflect this uncertainty, stating that:
Although the Model Rule does not allow payment by a client, the
Subcommittee realizes there is an argument to be made to allow
students to charge nominal fees so as to enhance the client's own
interest in the case, to allow the'client to "save face," and to give
the student some experience, however inadequate, with the pro-
cess of setting and collecting fees.2 53
District or circuit courts should consider a provision allowing fees to be
charged, perhaps with a bar-approved dollar limit25' or other restrictions
if such parameters are thought necessary to eliminate the problem of pro-
grams' "stealing" compensated cases from the private practitioner. Thus,
clinical programs could present a varied, well-rounded docket for intro-
ducing the student to cases outside the poverty level sector and in "tradi-
tional fields of law."255 The district courts should also consider a provi-
sion for student practice outside the academic sphere, perhaps in a non-
credit context, where the student as a clerk seeks experience under
proper supervision and receives payment for work as a law clerk with pri-
vate firms, legal aid societies, or prosecution or defense agencies.
Under the 1969 ABA Rule, the student must
[n]either ask for nor receive any compensation or renumeration of
any kind for his services from the person on whose behalf he ren-
ders services, but this shall not prevent a lawyer, legal aid bureau,
law school, public defender agency, or the State from paying com-
pensation to the eligible law student, nor shall it prevent any




A recent amendment has changed the ABA Rule's position on acceptance
of cases from other than indigents,257 and this should be a feature of any
new federal student practice rules. The 1969 ABA Rule's provision has
been followed by most student practice rules in the federal courts.2 58
25, See MODFL RULE § F(2), in FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 17, 20.
25 Id. at 10.
" Id. at 21.
255 Id. at 20.
2" ABA RuLE § III(E), in Leleiko, supra note 5, at 994; KITCH, supra note 15, at 229.
257 See AMENDED ABA RuLE § I (allowing student practice in compensated cases).
2" See D.C. Cm. R. 20 (H)(a)(5); 2D CIR. Supp. R. § 46(e)(3)(v); 3D CIR. R.
9(2)(1I)(a)(v); 4TH Cm. Supp. R. 13(e); D. CONN. R. Civ. P. 26 (3)(d); D.D.C.R. 209(b)(3);
N.D. GA. R. 71.925; D. HAWAII R. 4(b); D. IDAHO R. 2(g) (incorporating by reference IDAHO
Sup. CT. R. 123(D)(6)); S.D. IowA RuLE § 4; D. KAN. R. § III (E); E.D. LA. R. 21.13(e); M.D.
LA. R. 1J(2)(e); D. ME. R. 8(b)(4); D. MINN STUDENT PRACITICE R. 2(e); E.D. Mo. R. 26
(incorporating by reference Mo. Sup. CT. R. 13.02(d)); D. MONT. R. § III(E); D. NEB. R.
5(N)(6) (relating to private client representation and apparently assuming that government
work under D. NEB. R. 5(M) will be compensated); E.D.N.Y.R. 4.1(3)(e); N.D.N.Y. SPECIAL
R. No. 1, § 3(d); E.D. PA. R. 9 2, § II(E); D.S. DAK. R. 2, § 8.2 (5); W. D. TENN. R. 1(a)(1)
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There is no declaration in these rules relative to workload of students.
The Northern District of Ohio is perhaps unique in its anticipation of
part of the Model Rule:
In all cases, the student shall receive no compensation, directly or
indirectly, for his participation, other than the award of academic
credit by his law school. This rule shall not preclude a person who
is salaried by a non-profit agency (e.g., Legal Aid Office) from en-
gaging in student practice pursuant to this rule.
2 9
The District of South Carolina permits student compensation but also
declares that "[t]he law student will receive course credit from the law
school for his participation in the clinical programs. "260
A serious problem, parallelling the no-compensation rule for student
advocates, is the issue of funding the clinical program. Compared with
traditional forms of legal education, clinics are much more expensive,
whether viewed from a per-student operational expense, or capital outlay
viewpoint..26  The greatest burden of funding clinical programs has fallen
on the law school's general budget, which has supported nearly three-
fourths of all projects over the past decade, and which has covered over
eighty-five percent of the programs during the last three years. Relatively
minor sources have been foundations (principally CLEPR), which have
contributed less than ten percent in recent years; bar committees, which
have accounted for never more than five percent in any survey year; and
other agencies which have given varying small amounts.262 Clinical pro-
grams, however, have been found "quite viable from a budgetary stand-
point, although 'hard choices' may be required in connection with "the
kind of educational program a school wants to offer." 263
If the law schools are to continue to develop as responsive academic
professional institutions,2 " funding may be the critical issue for the next
(forbidding compensation from client or compensation from court presumably through
Criminal Justice Act funds); E.D. VA. R. 7(N)(lI)(E); W.D. VA. THIRD YEAR PRACTICE R.
II(E). The language varies with the rules; occasionally the no-compensation requirement is
tied to the student's certification. A few rules omit reference to the possibility of compensa-
tion from other sources, or state that expenses may be charged or that the supervisor may
charge a proper fee.
"5 N.D. OHIO. R. 2(i)(2).
" D.S.C. ORDER § e.
181 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22, 26.
26 1977-78 CLEPR SuRvEY, supra note 3, at x-xi, 55-68; FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at
23.
283 See Swords, Including Clinical Education in the Law School Budget, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 309, 351-52; see also Putz, Including
Clinical Education in the Law School Budget, in CLEPR CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 2, at 101, 106-10; P. SWORDS & F. WALwE, THE COSTS AND RESOURCES OF LEGAL EDU-
CATION 187-90 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SWORDS & WALWER]. For general sources on law
school finance see id.; note 291 infra.
I" The distinction between an "academic" institution as part of a university and the
professional school is deliberately blended here. As discussed in Part IV of this article, there
has been a long debate on this issue. See text accompanying notes 280-302 infra.
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decade as legal education faces the simultaneous impact of diminished
admissions applications due to a perceived over-supply of lawyers and a
decline in college-age population; the drain of inflation on endowments,
budgets and salaries; and complaints from taxpayers who are inflation-
escalated into higher tax brackets. The private universities also face law
alumni who have less to give because of the tax bite and inroads of infla-
tion. Perhaps borrowing, "backstopped by the federal government, [will
be] the prime source of funds" for legal education and therefore its
clinical component in the future.2 3 However, clinicians and law school
administrators should consider as many income-generating or cost-free al-
ternatives within the clinical program to blunt the need for outside
sources.
Legal Services Corporation funds266 have been a traditional source for
clinical programs, but their employment has been limited to civil practice
matters. Grants, up to $75,000 per school, are now available under Title
XI of the Higher Education Act.26 7 Many states also have civil or criminal
indigent representation programs that have funded clinical activities in
part. However, the Model Rule, if widely adopted by the federal courts,
should greatly expand the availability of yet another major source of gov-
ernmental support: the Criminal Justice Act (CJA). 68 While the use of
qualified but non-compensated student assistance might reduce costs to
the government,'269 handling CJA-related cases can produce some income
for the clinical budget. Postconviction cases carry a fee of $250, misde-
meanors $400, and felonies $1,000, as maximum limits for trials and ap-
peals, unless the Chief Judge of the district or circuit allows a higher
amount.2 7 0 While these rates were not set to enrich the practicing bar,
2 71
and by parity of reasoning the clinical programs, the hourly rates of $20
for office work and $30 for courtroom appearances can easily result in
maximum fee generation in many felony or misdemeanor cases. 27 2 It
265 See PACKER-ENRLICH REPORT, supra note 16, at 63-76.
26 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996b(a), 2996f(b) (1976).
2'7 Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1136-36b (1976). Work-
study arrangements, also provided for by the Act, might be considered as well. See 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1070a, 1070e (1976).
2U 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1976). If fees go to the law school, the supervisor may escape
personal tax liability even though he is payee on the check. See Rev. Rul. 74-581, 1974-2
C.B. 25; Rev. Rul. 65-282, 1965-2 C.B.21. For a discussion of other fees sources see note 46
supra.
260 See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 25; accord, Bartels, Clinical Legal Educa-
tion and the Delivery of Legal Services: The View From the Prosecutor's Office, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENr, supra note 2, at 203-08 (computation of prosecution time
and costs).
270 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1976).
271 H.R. REP. No. 1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3982, 3984.
272 No clinical lawyer should "pad" his hours, for there are definite professional, civil
and criminal sanctions. Additionally, such a practice would give the program, its law school,
and ultimately legal education a bad name. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
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might be argued that these may be the sort of cases that the practicing
bar, particularly beginning general practitioners, would wish to have for
professional or financial reasons.27 38 Few lawyers, however, will want cer-
tain kinds of these cases, such as postconviction appointments, which
usually require careful review of a voluminous state2 74 and/or federal27
record, and the complicated case for trial or appeal that will easily exceed
the statutory limits. To be sure, the practicing bar should not be excluded
from these classes of litigation, because public-spirited lawyers have al-
ways responded to their obligation to undertake unpopular or uncompen-
sated cases,2 76 but the law clinic's student advocates will offer an altern-
tive for effective representation. The bar should continue to supply a
good example and ideal for representation in these cases. Properly under-
stood and limited, student practice in CJA cases can be a real assistance
to the proper. administration of justice and the discharge of this obliga-
tion of the bar. Each group can learn from the other in a properly admin-
istered CJA program; it should be the duty of the supervising courts,
their bar committees, the law schools and the clinical programs to assure
that unseemly squabbles over fees are eliminated. This has been done in
the Legal Services field by and large, and it can be done in the CJA area
as well.
Many legal aid programs have received funding from charities, bar as-
sociations and governments,2 77 and the blending of law school-adminis-
tered programs with legal aid may offer another method of support with
perhaps another participant in the process, particularly if the source is
private charity. It should be remembered that he who pays the piper usu-
ally calls the tune.
The Cramton Report is quite positive in its insistence that the ABA,
members of the legal profession, law firms and the organized bar have a
positive obligation to assist and support general legal education and par-
ticularly the development of legal skills training programs within the law
Canons 1, 2, EC 1-5, 2-16 to 2-17, DR 2-106; 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976); 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001,
1341 (1976). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, Canon 6, EC 6-5.
273 Cf. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21 (recognizing that courts may choose to allow
law graduates who participated in student practice program to continue trial or appellate
appearances between graduation and admittance to bar).
"' The exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) and the ensuing develop-
ment of an adequate state trial and/or post conviction record for review, when added to the
state prisoner's often voluminous complaints and correspondence, often results in an enor-
mous amount of documents to consider. Thus, the $250 maximum fee may often be eaten up
after careful review of the records and initial legal research, even before seeing the client or
proceeding to hearing. See generally Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); 28 U.S.C. §§
2242, 2247, 2254(d)-(j) (1976).
115 The voluminious records review that occurs on appeal may also occur on a federal
prisoner's motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
278 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canons 2, 7, 8; EC 2-16, 2-24 to 2-
29, 2-31 to 2-32, 7-1, 7-4, 7-9 to 7-12, 8-3.
"7 See Toll, CLEPR from the Viewpoint of Legal Aid and Legal Services, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 17, 20-22.
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school. This goal, of course, includes clinical education. The Report also
urges federal and state government support of law schools and their stu-
dents, suggesting that the Higher Education Act support be expanded to
all aspects of legal education. The Report states that "[t]he Legal Ser-
vices Corporation should assume the financial support of the services ren-
dered eligible clients by law school clinical programs in which service is a
by-product of a sound educational experience."2 8
The no-compensation rule is consistent with the stated principal Pur-
pose of the Model Rule, 79 the promotion of better practice legal educa-
tion for a better trial bar of the future. The admonition about hours of
work required of a clinical advocate is consistent, if understated, if the
law school curriculum is restructured to accommodate a clinical semester,
quarter, or half-semester. Restrictions on payments to students will allow
a properly-managed clinical program to budget more accurately. If the
number of cases are known, the fees and other financial sources for each
case are quantified in advance and therefore the gross income is known
with some certainty, and the net needs of the program then can be deter-
mined for the general law school budget. Students may, of course, receive
scholarships or tuition remissions based on need, academic merit, law
school policy, or the wishes of the donor, as they do now under traditional
procedures. While the present financial sources for funding clinical pro-
grams are limited, it is anticipated that these sources should increase in
amount or be solicited for an increase as in the case of alumni donations.
IV. Beyond the Model Rule: Projections for the Future
The Model Rule, if widely adopted by the circuit and district courts,
would represent a major policy shift in the stated purposes of clinical le-
gal education for the federal court system. The principal emphasis of this
new approach would be education to produce more competent law stu-
dents and hence better lawyers,280 with the subsidiary goals of service to
the client and to the courts. The old dual theme of aid to the indigent,
and therefore assistance to the system of justice and the client, plus the
encouragement of clinical instruction in the law schools, will have been
substantially modified. As outlined in Part III above, the Model Rule's
provisions are, for the most part, adequate for its stated or implied pur-
poses. As such, the Model Rule is an excellent "third generation" model
for student practice programs, the first being early statutes such as Colo-
rado's and the second those rules patterned on the ABA proposal. The
revised ABA Rule, permitting student work in compensated cases, is a
21s CRAMTON REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-7, 28-32.
219 MODEL RuLE § A, in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; seealIso text accompanying
notes 65-85 supra.
28o See Pincus, The Clinical Component in University Professional Education, 32 OHIO
ST. L. J. 283, 290-302 (1971). This article also comments on the humanization of the educa-
tional process by the clinical component and its impact on the university as a whole. Id.; see
also Stone, supra note 17, at 427.
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recognition of the fact that students are capable of handling every area of
practice. It is another good third generation model.
The Model Rule and its Comments leave unanswered a number of col-
lateral issues that will begin to shape the contours of clinical education.
Some of these factors, if applied too vigorously, could warp clinical pro-
grams. Additionally, if applied in connection with the clinical component,
the factors could seriously distort legal education at a particular school
and even the function of a supporting university. These problem areas are
categorized below, not in an exhaustive discussion of issues followed by
concrete solutions that can be readily adopted, but to state them so that
those considering aaopting of a Model Rule program may consider them
as issues from the beginning. The issues are potentially as complex as
policy-science phase analysis, 81 and their solution requires that sort of
multidimensional, multifaceted approach to assure the most satisfactory
result.
2 2
One resource at the command of courts, their committees, law schools,
and clinicians is the growing wealth of material on historical trends in
particlar law schools and legal education. 283 These studies, compared with
281 For short discussions of policy-science phase analysis, see Moore, Prolegomenon to
the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REV. 662, 669 (1968);
Suzuki, The New Haven School of International Law: An Invitation to a Policy-Oriented
Jurisprudence, 1 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 23-27 (1974); Walker, Sea Power and
the Law of the Sea: The Need for a Contextual Approach, 30 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 88,
95-97 (1978), reprinted in, 83 Mm. L. REV. 131, 155-59 (1979), 7 OCEAN DEVEL. & INT'L L. J.
299, 307-15 (1979). The framework for analysis in Part IV is drawn, albeit loosely, from this
model.
282 Indeed, Professors McDougal and Lasswell argued for a multidimensional, mul-
tifaceted approach to legal education nearly forty years ago. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J.
203 (1943). This seminal article, however, has had little success in producing change in the
structure of legal education. Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors, 54
VA. L. REV. 619 (1968); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 403, 530-31 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn ed. 1971). Professor McDougal has
noted that "[tihere should be simply one kind of education - education for the lawyer, for
the profession," arguing that there should be no distinction between training of practition-
ers and education for the scholar or the educator. McDougal, Comment, in THE LAW SCHOOL
OF ToMMORROW, supra note 85, at 201, 206.
283 See generally Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Com-
petency, 1977 B.Y.L. REV. 695 (containing useful surveys of history of American and En-
glish legal education; parallel studies in sister professions of business, accountancy, and
medicine; and current themes in contemporary legal education). A. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES (1953) [hereinafter cited as HARNO]; A REED, TRAINING FOR THE
PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,
Bull. No. 15, 1921) [hereinafter cited as REED]; Stevens, Legal Education: Historical
Prespectives, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 43. The histo-
ries of several law schools, or law schools within a particular state, have been the subject of
separate volumes. See, e.g., T. BARNES, HASTINGS, COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FIRST CENTURY
(1978) [hereinafter cited as BARNES]; E. BROWN, LEGAL EDUCATION AT MICHIGAN: 1859-1959
(1959); J. GOEBEL, A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW: COLUMBIA UNIVERSIrY (1955); W.
JOHNSON, supra note 135, at 80; A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD (1967). In other cases
the tale of the law school has been submerged in a general history of the university of which
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recent projections for the future of legal education such as the Packer-
Ehrlich Report284 or the Carrington Report,2 5 indicate that the salient
tensions - intellectual and otherwise - are not new or unique to legal
education. However, a certifying court or interested bar committee must
realize that each institution has particular themes, emphases or interests
projecting from the past. Consequently, these courts and committees
should -consult general and specific sources to become familiar with the
major issues in legal education applicable to the specific law school and
the university of which it is a part. The sponsoring court should also con-
sider the basic philosophies of higher education that the university has
articulated; these stated functions, purposes or general goals may be re-
flective of the hospitality with which the university, and its law school
component, will greet a proposal for a Model Rule-oriented program.2 8 6
it became a part. See, e.g., 3 G. PASCHAL, HISTORY OF WAKE FOREST COLLEGE, 303-28 (1943)
(Wake Forest Law School). Indeed, examination of a general history of the university of'
which the law school is a part may reveal some of the local policies or stresses that have
impacted on the law school through time. A good general bibliography of historical trends,
stresses and current issues in higher education is contained in NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444
U.S. 672, 686-90 (1980); see also M. KEETON, SHARED AUTHORITY ON CAMPUS (1971). There is
little mention in KEETON of legal education in the context of the development of profes-
sional education. Id. at 198-210. The book is valuable, however, as a general history of the
growth of colleges and universities in the United States. Most of these sources have bibliog-
raphies for the reader who would wish to pursue specific topics more closely. See, e.g., id. at
515-27 (listing standard histories of particular colleges or universities). Other sources are
biographies of faculty members, articles in bar journals, law reviews, or oral traditions and
histories from senior faculty members. The latter source underscores the need for all partici-
pants to become aware of other perspectives, whether this be in formal conferences, profes-
sional associations such as bar meetings, or informal social gatherings. The investigator
should realize that sacrosanct standard sources may be challenged, perhaps justifiably, by
others. See, e.g., BARNES, supra at 206-25. (criticizing REED, supra in the context of Has-
tings Law School's experience); Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practi-
tioners, in LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY, supra at 551, 591 (reporting objections of Albert M.
Kales, developer of the "Missouri Plan" for choosing judges; also reporting objections to
1921 Reed Report by Arthur L. Corbin of Yale School and Dean Harlan F. Stone of Colum-
bia Law School, later to be Chief Justice of the United States).
The safe course is as comprehensive an appraisal of the sources, formal to unwritten, as
is possible under the circumstances. See Lasswell, Toward Continuing Appraisal of the Im-
pact of Law on Society, in THE LAW SCHOOL OF TOMORROW, supra note 85, at 87-127.
See note 16 supra.
285 Carrington, Training for the Public Profession of the Law: 1971, [1971] PRoc. ASS'N.
AM. L. SCHOOLS [hereinafter cited as the CARRINGTON REPORT], reprinted in PACKER-EHR-
LICH REPORT, supra note 16, at 93-328.
' The humanistic approach of Robert M. Hutchins in his essay, The University Law
School, in THE LAW SCHOOL OF ToMoRRow, supra note 85, at 5-24, should be compared with
some commentators' advocacy of a more pragmatic, relevant function for the law school.
See, e.g. Goodman, Comment, in id. at 24, 28; Hook, Comment in id. at 38, 42-43, 54. See
also McCormick, Discussion, in id, at 67; Hutchins, Reply, in id. at 77, 78; Pincus, Legal
Education in a Service Setting, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2,
at 27, 32-34 (noting differences between academic and clinical models for legal education).
Dean Manning's recent articulation of the characteristics of the legal profession, PACKER-
EHRLICH REPORT, supra note 16, at 22-23, is reflective of the dichotomous theory of educa-
tion at a law school, which must provide simultaneously a gradute level academic program
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Other important educational resources to be weighed include the rela-
tive intellectual quality and education of the law students. This is diffi-
cult to assess but important to determine in measuring the depth of
clinical experience feasible. The quality of the law faculty and its curricu-
lum is important, for it will be of little profit to begin a clinical program
if, for example, professional responsibility courses seemingly can only be
taught in the last semester of law school. Other considerations inlude the
quality of the law school and general university libraries, and the level of
basic legal research and skills training 'available as prerequisites for
clinical work.
The certifying court should also become familiar with the administra-
tive structure and capacity of the university, the law school, the law
faculty, and law student organizations, and their perspectives on the
clinical process. For example, a tight-fisted central university administra-
tion that has little interest in innovative projects that involve heavy "seed
money" may strangle a program from the start, unless outside grants or
other sources of funding are available. By contrast, enthusiastic law
school administration and faculty support can be a positive factor. The
court should also be aware of the attitudes of judges who will be asked to
participate, 27 as well as the perspectives of bar associations or individual
lawyers who are prospective adjunct faculty. The attitude of lawyers and
bar groups, whether active participants or not, is also important. How the
public and potential clients would view a clinical program and the rela-
tive attractiveness of legal education are additional factors that the court
should consider. Law schools have recently been blessed with an over-
abundance of excellent students, but the predicted drop in enrollments288
may soon follow the current decline in applications, and law schools may
be admitting students with weaker records in greater numbers to fill up
classes to maintain a budget. These students may not be able to under-
take both a vigorous clinical program and their courses, possibly resulting
in fewer applicants for a fully-developed and expensive clinical curricu-
lum. If clinical training is mandatory by school policy or court rule,288 the
outcome will of course be different. Inflation may force more students to
undertake paid clerking rather than the extra hours that a non-compen-
sated clinical program would entail.
290
The problems of financing the program must be considered in the con-
text of impact on the law school budget,291 the general university budget,
and professional training. See also HARNO, supra note 283, at 122-23.
2" See text accompanying notes 223-225 supra.
288 Brickman, CLEPR and Clinical Education: A Review and Analysis, in CLINICAL ED-
UCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 56, 80.
289 See DEvrrr REPORT, supra note 1, at 229-31.
2,0 See Putz, Including Clinical Education in the Law School Budget, in CLEPR CON-
FERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 101, 107.
191 Professors Swords and Walwer have compiled the most recent comprehensive study
of the problems of financing a clinical program. See generally SWORDS & WALWER, supra
note 263. For a discussion of the historical trends in funding legal education, see generally
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and the incomes of lawyers in the community who depend in part on fees
from cases coming under the clinical program. The allocation of the
court's limited resources must also be considered, particularly in a time of
inflation when the burdened taxpayer has become sharply critical of all
governmental spending, including the expenses of a judicial system.
The situational aspects of the clinical program must be considered as
well. Where should its office be located in relation to the law school
facilites, the courthouse, and the clients?29 2 What "logistic support" -
from static resources such as start-up library and office furnishing
through flow resources such as photocopying and supplements - will be
available, and how may they be used most economically? For example,
perhaps an office with a minimum book collection in the federal building
or a downtown county library may be less expensive than attempting to
duplicate a collection; on the other hand, it may be more financially ad-
vantageous to locate near the clients or in the law school. In this regard
time is an important factor too. While some lawsuits have been
researched on the drive to the courthouse, this is hardly the way to train
student advocates; time might be saved, and legal education enhanced, by
moving the court to the law school. The relative institutionalization of the
clinical program in relation to the local bar organization and the law
school's general education program should be weighed.2 93 If the local bar
and clinicians have worked well together on other projects, or if the
clincial program is fully and happily integrated into the law school curric-
ulum, the chances of a successful Model Rule project should be good. The
relative crisis level in the participating institutions should be investi-
gated. If court dockets are already crowded, so that judicial efficiency is
impaired in its primary task;29 or if the law school is in transition and
unsettled;29 5 or if the local bar is involved in a controversy, such as the
HARNO, supra note 283; REED, supra note 283; Stevens, supra note 283. See also CAR-
RINGTON REPORT, supra note 285, at 101-10; PACKER-EHRLICH REPORT, supra note 16, at 63-
76; Swords, Including Clinical Legal Education in the Law School Budget, in CLINICAL ED-
UCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 309-55; AALS, SPEcIAL COMM. ON LAW
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION AND UNIVERSITY RELATIONS, ANATOMY OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCA-
TION, 12-17, 22-28, 35-40, 49-131, 194-205, 251-76, 295-99, 371-403, 449-62 (1961); Stevens,
supra note 283, at 546-47 n. 14.
", See Ferren, Goals, Models and Prospects for Clinical-Legal Education, in KITCH,
supra note 15, at 94, 98-104 (postulating nine different clinical training models, aspects of
which might be incorporated in particular program); see also Bartels, Clinical Legal Educa-
tion and the Delivery of Legal Services: The View from the Prosecutor's Office, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 190-193; Oliphant, Directing and Man-
aging Legal Education in a Service Setting, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT,
supra note 2, at 356-57.
M The DEvrrr REPORT, supra note 1, at 222, suggests that particular law school clinical
program participation might be enough to satisfy experience requirements recommended by
the Report. Professor Leleiko states that in the long run, student practice should be re-
quired for admission to practice before the courts. Leleiko, supra note 5, at 937.
'" See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 4-6
(1976).
" The almost geometric increase in number of students, and the transformation of
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recent issue over lawyer advertising,29 or with the courts on some issue,
29 7
then the chance of success of another newly-introduced variable - Model
Rule litigation - will be the less. Participants should also examine the
persuasive modalities of strategies for implementing a Model Rule clinical
program. A careful study of reasonably expected income from clinical
cases,298 plus grants,2 9 9 might blunt arguments against adopting an
ambitous program because of lack of money. Initial involvement of the
law school, the university and the practicing bar in re-evaluating and per-
haps restructuring the curriculum might be more productive than impos-
ing a coercive formula for a clinical program by independently-derived
local rule of court. Finally, the projected long and short term results of
the program should be considered.
Having analyzed the alternatives by phases as sketched above, the
craftsmen of a Model Rule should then postulate carefully the articulated
goals of clinical legal education at a particular institution in its particular
contextual environment.300 Additionally, past trends - not only of
clinical programs, but also within the particular law school, and in legal
and higher education in general - should be described and analyzed.
Conditions affecting those trends should also be analyzed carefully, per-
haps using a full phase analysis as advocated above. Future trends should
be projected, with a review of projected conditions such as the economy
affecting the extrapolations. Finally, alternatives should be considered
carefully so that the best choice can be made for the participating law
schools and the court.30 1 When all factors and alternatives have been
weighed, compromises may be in order as between competing programs,
interests or concepts. If a sincere effort has been made to weigh alterna-
tives, the decision maker will at least see that there are choices and thus
will be able to proceed to a more rational, if labored, result. The end
product should be a better, more inclusive local rule30 2 and a planned
clinical program that is more satisfactory for its participants: students,
the law school and its faculty, the university, the bar, and the court, not
to mention the clients and the public.
schools from small, initimate places to large operations are responsible for must of the tran-
sititions in law schools today. See SWORDS & WALWER, supra note 263, at 47.
See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
29 See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 584 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (challenge to Virginia
Supeme Court disciplinary rule that restricted lawyers' comments about pending litigation);
see also Virginia Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (1980).
, See text accompanying note 268 supra.
,8 See text accompanying note 267 supra.
300 See PACKER-EHRLICH REPORT, supra note 16, at 97; HARNO, supra note 283, at 162.
o Suzuki, supra note 281, at 33-41; Moore, supra note 281, at 672-73; Walker, supra
note 281, at 160-161.
"' See notes 180 & 181 supra (identifying examples of underinclusive rules that may
needlessly limit student practice).
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V. Conclusions
"[S]tudent practice is an opportunity for the court and not a threat to
it. '303 It is also an opportunity for the law schools and their faculties, for
higher education, for the students, and for the bar.3s ' In sum, it is a
threat to none. The Model Rule proposed by the Judicial Conference of
the United States, while not without its potential minor deficiencies as
discussed in Part I of this article, is a valuable tool for enriching legal
education while contributing to service to clients and assistance to the
court.305 It is worthy of serious consideration and adoption, perhaps with
modifications, by the district and circuit courts of the United States. Be-
cause its goals and methodology differ, in some instances radically, from
present student practice rules, those courts with local rules that wish to
adopt the Model Rule should carefully study the changes and implica-
tions flowing from them. These courts and courts considering adoption of
a rule for the first time have a unique opportunity to make a fully in-
formed decision for better legal education. The experimental period of
the clinical movement is over. Mistakes have been made and successes
have been reported, but the, concept has penetrated into nearly every law
school and jurisdiction in the country. The clinical programs of today
may yet be in their spirited adolescence, as trends in legal education go,
but the relative wealth of experience now available points to a more in-
formed, better reasoned decision by the federal courts as they consider
adoption of the Model Rule. Such being the case, adopting courts and
other participants in the process may proceed upon thorough analysis to-
wards a considered decision for a clinical program that really serves all
participants in the legal process - lawyers, clients, judges, court systems,
legal education, law students, and ultimately the public.
Three justices of the Supreme Court have felt that "law students can
be expected to make a significant contribiution, quantitatively, to the rep-
resentation of the poor in many areas. . . ."306 The broadened ABA Rule
and the federal Model Rule, if adopted, present an opportunity for law
students to make that contribution, and more.
It would be tragic indeed it judges were to spurn student practice
and its potential contributions or if students were accepted in
principle but so hedged about with restrictions that their utility
was drastically reduced. Student practice is not a favor to the stu-
dents and the law schools, by any means. It is an arrangement
3o3See Greene, Judging the Students: Judicial Attitudes on Student Practice, in
CLimNCAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAw Snmmxr, supra note 2, at 262, 277.
30 See Voorhees, Discussion, in THE LAw SCHOOL OF TOMORROW, supra note 85, at 233,
234.
3 See text accompanying notes 70 & 71 supra.
0 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, J., con-
curring); see also Jones, Law School Clinical Programs: The View from the Defender's Of-
fice, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT, supra note 2, at 181, 182.
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that offers advantages to all those who participate in it, not least
of all judges.1°
The only footnote to those thoughtful remarks of a District of Columbia
Superior Court judge would be that student practice offers advantages to
all participants.
307 Greene, Judging the Students: Judicial Attitudes on Student Practice, in CLINICAL
EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUrNT, supra note 2, at 262, 278.
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